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DISCOVERY IN RULEMAKING
CHARLES

H.

KOCH, JR.*

INTRODUCTION

For years, administrative law theorists have advocated alternatives to
the use of judicial mechanisms in administrative decision-making. 1 The
search for alternatives has greatly increased the use of rulemaking procedures. At the same time, rulemaking itself has evolved into a flexible
procedural tool which can be tailored to the needs of specific administrative
problems.
Too often this evolutionary development has involved exploring
methods for engrafting selected judicial mechanisms onto the essentially

* Assistant Professor of Law, DePaul University; B.A. 1966, University of Maryland;
J.D. 1969, George Washington University; LL.M. 1975, University of Chicago.
THE FOLLOWING CITATIONS WILL BE USED IN THIS ARTICLE:
ADVISORY COMMITIEE ON CIVIL RULES, EXPLANATORY STATEMENT CONCERNING AMENDMENTS OF DISCOVERY RULES, 48 F.R.D. 487 (1970) [hereinafter cited as RULES ADVISORY
COMM.];
Gellhorn, The Treatment of Confidential Information by the Federal Trade Commission:
Pretrial Practices, 36 U. CHI. L. REv. 113 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Gellhorn];
Hamilton, Rulemaking on a Record by the Food and Drug Administration, 50 TEX. L. REV.
1132 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Hamilton];
Tomlinson, Discovery in Agency Adjudication, 1971 DUKE L.J. 89 [hereinafter cited as
Tomlinson]
Comment, Discovery in Federal Administrative Proceedings, 16 STAN. L. REV. 1035 (1964)
[hereinafter cited as Stanford Comment];
Note, Informal Bargaining Process: An Analysis of the SEC's Regulation of the New York
Stock Exchange, 80 YALE L.J. 811 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Yale Note].
1. E.g., ASH COMMISSION, A NEW REGULATORY FRAMEWORK, REPORT ON SELECTED INDEPENDENT REGULATORY AGENCIES 5 (1971); Baker, Policy by Rule or Ad Hoc Approach-Which
Should It Be?, 22 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 658 (1957); Sh~piro, The Choice of Rulemaking or
Adjudication in the Development of Administrative Policy, 78 HARV. L. REV. 921, 972 (1965).
See I K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE§ 7.07 (1958) (suggesting that due process does
not require a formal hearing where no adjudicative facts are in dispute); Fuchs, Procedure in
Administrative Rule-Making, 52 HARV. L. REV. 259, 278 (1938) (contending that the adversary
procedure is ill-suited to the formulation of general regulations).
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legislative process of rulemaking. Almost without exception, these efforts at
innovation urge the use of the testimonial devices of trial. Yet, rulemaking,
like a legislative hearing, is essentially investigatorial; its purpose is to
gather as much information as possible concerning a particular, sometimes
very limited, policy question. 2 The testimonial devices of the trial process,
on the other hand, are purifiers. Some, particularly the rules of evidence,
actually exclude great quantities of relevant, material and often valuable
information. Because they do not increase the quantity of information, they
often detract from, rather than aid, the investigative function of the rulemaking process. 3
While the testimonial devices of trial have received an inordinate
amount of attention, little consideration has been given to the informationgathering mechanisms of the judicial process. 4 These mechanisms are traditionally combined under the term discovery. This Article will discuss those
mechanisms usually associated with discovery as they may relate to the
rulemaking function.

THE

CONCEPTUAL BASIS FOR DISCOVERY IN RULEMAKING

The right to discovery is not firmly established in administrative procedure, and indications are that agencies do not guarantee discovery mechanisms in their decision-making processes. 5 The Administrative Procedure Act
(APA) makes no provision for discovery in rulemaking. 6 Section 4(b)
permits "interested persons" to submit written information, views or arguments, and provides for more formal proceedings where, by statute, an
agency's rules must be "made on a record. " 7 It is clear that the drafters of
2. See ATIORNEY GENERAL'S COMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, FINAL REPORT
105-08 (1941).
3. Testing the truth of facts and the basis of opinion is not insignificant in rulemaking.
Where the truth of facts is at issue, though, methods other than the trial process may in some
cases be more efficient for testing accuracy. See National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v.
NRC, 547 F.2d 663, 645 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
4. Discovery has been described as "the key to effective federal civil procedure,"
Rosenberg, Sanctions to Effectuate Pretrial Discovery, 58 CoLUM. L. REV. 480, 481 (1958), and
is generally considered essential to fair litigation. See RULES ADVISORY COMM. 489. The federal
law relating to judicial pre-trial practice is contained in FED. R. C1v. P. 26-37.
5. See W. GELLHORN & C. BYSE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND COMMENTS 564 (6th
ed. 1974); B. ScHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 279 (1976). The NLRB, for example, is just now
considering adoption of prehearing discovery. See Quarterly Meeting of Task Force on NLRB,
91 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 286-87 (1976).
6. See Wright, The Courts and the Rulemaking Process: The Limits ofJudicial Review, 59
CORNELL L. REV. 375, 381-84 (1974).
7. APA § 4(b), 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1970). The Supreme Court has required strict interpretation of the APA requirement of formal hearing in rulemaking. See United States v.
Florida East Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224, 237-38 (1973); United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel
Corp., 406 U.S. 742, 756-57 (1972). No procedural safeguards have been found to be constitutionally mandated in rulemaking. See Note, The Judicial Role in Defining Procedural Requirement for Agency Rulemaking, 87 HARV. L. REv. 782, 785, 787 n.34 (1974).
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the APA envisioned the role of participants as primarily adding to the fund
of knowledge available to the agency, and did not see "interested persons"
as antagonists. 8 As a result, they felt no need to assure the participants an
avenue for obtaining information for the purpose of vindicating any particular point of view.
The absence of a specific statutory provision for discovery, however,
does not necessarily mean that a rulemaking agency will not be required to
provide it. Administrative agencies have been urged to provide for discovery in all formal proceedings. 9 Although there has been little interest in the
establishment of discovery procedures for informal processes, 10 due process
considerations may require the availability of some means of discovery. The
8. S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 200-01,258-59 (1946). See ArroRNEY GENERAL's
MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 26 (1947).
9. See ATIORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT at 89;
Berger, Discovery in Administrative Proceedings: Why Agencies Should Catch Up with the
Courts, 46 A.B.A.J. 74 (1960).
The Administrative Conference of the United States studied the problem of discovery in
agency proceedings and made a recommendation with respect to the adoption of discovery in
formal adjudication. Recommendation No. 21: Discovery in Agency Adjudication, in 1 RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS OF THE AD. CONF. OF THE U.S. 37 (1968-70). However, the Conference specifically excluded rulemaking from its analysis:
Formal discovery rules have apparently never been tested in administrative rulemaking • . . . Rulemaking proceedings, even those subject to sections 7 and 8 [5 U.S.C.
§§ 556 and 557] of the Administrative Procedure Act, raise different considerations
which require a separate model for discovery. Rule making frequently involves large
numbers of parties and a wide range of issues, including basic issues of national
policy. These features are found much less frequently in adjudicatory proceedings
and make impracticable the wholesale application of these Discovery Recommendations to rulemaking. This Report therefore does not consider the applicability of
discovery to rulemaking.
Report of the Comm. on Compliance and Enforcement Proceedings in Support of Recommendation No. 21, in 1 RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS OF THE AD. CONF. OF THE U.S. 577, 582
(1968-70). A more recent Conference recommendation expands the coverage of the discovery
scheme to formal rulemaking. Subpoena Power in Formal Rulemaking and Formal Adjudication (Recommendation No. 74-1), 1 C.F.R. § 305.74-1 (1976). See Explanatory Memorandum in
Support of Recommendation 74-1: Subpoena Powers in Formal Agency Proceedings, in 3
RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS OF THE AD. CONF. OF THE U.S. 408 (1973-74).
For a discussion of the advisability of discovery in Food and Drug Administration formal
rulemaking, see Hamilton 1170-75:
The Administrative Conference has made extensive recommendations dealing
with prehearing discovery in agency adjudications; arguably such recommendations
should also be applicable to section 70l(e) [of the Food', Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21
U.S.C. § 37l(e) (1970)] proceedings. Rulemaking on a record, however, differs from
typical agency adjudication in two important respects: first, the issues are usually
considerably broader in rulemaking than in adjudication; and secondly, the issues
have been substantially explored in the proposal-comment-order portion of the section 701(e) procedure. The danger of surprise is thus not as great as in normal
adjudication. As a result, in rulemaking on a record the efforts of discovery should be
directed toward isolating issues and building a record rather than toward learning
witnesses' versions of what happened. Any discovery procedures should be carefully
tailored to the peculiar needs of the section 701(e) procedure.
ld. at 1171-72 (emphasis in original).
10. See Tomlinson 92-93 (suggesting that formal discovery may detract from informal
processes).
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Supreme Court's decision in Goldberg v. Kelly 11 signaled a new approach
to the requirement of providing an opportunity to participate. It is no longer
sufficient for an agency to stop with the unilateral determination of whether
or not a trial-type hearing is required by statute; the analysis must also
include an examination of the extent to which fairness requires the availability of some adversarial procedures. Since Goldberg, it is necessary to
determine whether something less than a full trial-type hearing-"some
kind of hearing"-may be appropriate where a full hearing is not. 12 This
more flexible approach has brought about "a due process explosion" 13 in
which procedures are being tailored to the individual decision-making process.14 Rather than paring the right to full trial-type procedure, this approach
opens the way to some form of public proceedings where full-trial would be
either counter-productive or too extensive relative to the decision at hand.
This trend is reflected in recent cases involving rulemaking procedures.
In American Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 15 Judge Leventhal suggested that
cross-examination may be necessary in special informal rulemaking situations in the interest of fairness even though not required by statute. 16
Although this dictum did not have immediate impact, many courts ultimately began to consider tailoring informal rulemaking procedures in accordance
with the particular issue which had to be re~olved. 17 Most of these cases
II. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
12. See Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267 (1975).
13. ld. at 1268.
14. E.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (school disciplinary proceeding); Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557-58 (1974) (prison disciplinary proceeding). The Goldberg opinion
did not reach the question of what procedural safeguards are necessary where "there are no
factual issues in dispute or where the application of the rule of law is not intertwined with
factual issues." Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254,268 n.15 (1970).
15. 359 F.2d 624 (D.C. Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 843 (1966).
16. Id. at 632-33. Judge Leventhal reiterated his position in International Harvester v.
Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 649 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Friends of the Earth v. AEC, 485 F.2d 1031
(D.C. Cir. 1973), contains a very enlightening dialogue between Judge Bazelon and Judge
Leventhal. Judge Bazelon's opinion suggests that he would make cross-examination an almost
universal requirement in rulemaking. ld. at 1003. But see National Resources Defense Council,
Inc. v. NRC, 547 F.2d 633, 655-56 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (separate opinion of Bazelon, C.J.).
Apparently recognizing the substantial experience and scholarly opinion against crossexamination in rulemaking, Judge Leventhal took the position that while cross-examination
might have utility in formal rulemaking, it should be available only on a showing that it was the
only method for developing the necessarY information. ld. at 1035. Accord, Walter Hohm &
Co. v. Hardin, 449 F.2d 1009 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
17. E.g., City of Chicago v. FPA, 458 F.2d 731, 744(D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S.
1074 (1972):
The ability to choose with relative freedom the procedure it will use to acquire
relevant information gives the Commission power to realistically tailor the proceedings to fit the issues before it, the information it needs to illuminate those issues and
the manner of presentation which, in its judgments, will bring before it the relevant
information in the most efficient manner.
See South Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646,660 (1st Cir. 1974); Portland CementAss'n v.
Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974); Virgin Island
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were premised on the notion that considerations of fairness required the
engrafting of certain trial procedures onto the basic structure of notice and
comment rulemaking. In one case involving a Federal Power Commission
rule, however, the District of Columbia Circuit stated that some trial
procedures were needed in order to permit review of the rule. 18 The court
reasoned that in order to determine whether the Commission's findings of
fact were supported by "substantial evidence," the statutory standard for
review, it required a record which resembled that which would be produced
by a tria1. 19 The decision, therefore, was based not on the utility of the trial
procedures to the rulemaking process, but rather on the perceived need for
such procedures to enable a subsequent reviewing court to perform its duty
in a meaningful fashion. Two other circuits have rejected this analysis ,2° and
the District of Columbia Circuit itself has limited the holding of the case to a
requirement that agencies provide adequate notice to permit effective participation. 21 The prevailing approach, therefore, is to utilize age-old and
familiar techniques where they may be useful to the information-gathering
and policymaking functions of rulemaking. 22
One important procedural consideration is discovery. 23 While rulemakip.g is not adversarial in the traditional sense, self-interest cannot be ignored
Hotel Ass'n v. Virgin Island Water & Power Auth., 476 F.2d 1263 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1067 (1973); Kennecott Copper Corp. v. EPA, 462 F.2d 846 (D.C. Cir. 1972). Even in the
context of formal rulemaking, the tailored procedure approach affects the range of required
procedures. See, e.g., Long Island R.R. v. United States, 318 F. Supp. 490, 498-99 (E.D.N.Y.
1970), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. United States v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224
(1973) (written submission will be appropriate in most formal rulemaking).
18. Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 483 F.2d 1238 (D.C. Cir: 1973).
19. Id. at 1257-63.
20. Shell Oil Co. v. FPC, 520 F.2d 1061, 1075-76 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 2661
(1976); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. FPC, 475 F.2d 842, 851-52 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1146 (1973).
21. In American Public Gas Ass'n v. FPC, 498 F.2d 718, 723 (D.C. Cir. 1974), another
panel of the D.C. Circuit inaccurately but expediently read Judge Wilkey's opinion as holding
merely that the FPC had failed to give notice and an adequate opportunity to participate.
22. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. y. NRC, 547 F.2d 633, 644 (D.C. Cir.
1976); Walter Hohm & Co. v. Hardin, 449 F.2d 1009, 1016 (D.C. Cir. 1971) ("What counts is the
reality of an opportunity to submit an effective presentation . . . . "); cf. Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC,
503 F.2d 1250, 1267 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1026 (1975) ("mere significance and
complexity of the policy issues . . . do not render the . . . rejection of evidentiary hearings an
abuse of discretion"). See generally, Robinson, The Making of Administrative Policy: Another
Look at Rulemaking and Adjudication and Administrative Procedure Reform, 118 U. PA. L.
REV. 485, 504-06 (1970).
23. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. NRC, 547 F.2d 633, 653 (D.C. Cir.
1976) (listing several devices for improving procedure, including several traditional discovery
devices). As one commentator has noted in discussing judicial review of agency rulings,
"[s]wift access to information is often essential if challenges to administrative action are to be
successful." Note, The Freedom of Information Act: A Seven-Year Assessment, 74 CoLUM. L.
REV. 895, 927 (1974). Discovery makes pleading less important. SeeK. DAVIS, supra note 1, §
8.04 (Supp. 1970).
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and it will compel persons and groups to present the agency with information supporting their position. This process serves to maximize the information available to the agency. 24 Therefore, although a sense of fairness alone
supports the availability of all the tools necessary to effective participation,
providing those with an interest in the decision an independent means of
uncovering information should also help to produce a better decision.
Recognition of the potential utility of discovery is important, since any
procedure which is not useful will almost surely be unfair to some interest.
For example, trial procedure in FDA rulemaking may increase the fairness
of the proceeding for the regulated industry, but the incidental delay causes
untold injury to the consuming public. Rulemaking involves different types
of interest groups with different perspectives on a variety of relevant issues.
Any procedure which protects one side without regard to the overall efficacy
of the rulemaking process will necessarily act to the detriment of other
interest groups or perspectives, including the general "public interest." In
examining the imposition of discovery techniques on rulemaking, therefore,
one must be sensitive to the interplay of fairness and utility.
APPLICATION OF THE VARIOUS DISCOVERY MECHANISMS
TO THE RULEMAKING PROCESS

The term discovery encompasses several mechanisms and areas of
analysis. The Administrative Conference's adjudicative discovery recommendation dealt with nine aspects of the discovery process: prehearing
conferences, depositions, witnesses, written interrogatories, requests for
admission, production of documents and tangible things, role of the presiding officer, protective orders, and subpoenas. 25 The following discussion of
discovery in rulemaking will also proceed according to these nine analytical
categories.

Prehearing Conferences
In informal rulemaking, the APA guarantees only an opportunity to
present written comment. 26 Nonetheless, agencies are resorting to oral
24. Hamilton, Procedures for the Adoption of Rules of General Applicability: The Need for
Procedural Innovation in Administrative Rulemaking, 60 CAL. L. REV. 1276, 1300-01 (1972). On
the other hand, there is a fear that "an open discovery system" may create a cumbersome
record and potential for industry harassment and delay. See Pedersen, Formal Records and
Informal Rulemaking, 85 YALE L.J. 38,86-88 (1975). Clearly, substantial controls are necessary
for discovery in informal rulemaking, but, as one commentator had explained:
The only rational justification for not employing discovery in administrative
adjudicatory proceedings must be that agencies differ from courts in ways related to
the appropriateness of discovery.
Stanford Comment 1058.
25. Discovery in Agency Adjudication (Recommendation No. 70-4), 1 C.F.R. §305.70-4
(1976). See note 9 supra.
26. APA § 4{b), 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1970).
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proceedings in rulemaking with increasing frequency, and the rise of hybrid
procedures requires or encourages agencies to permit some trial procedures.
Thus, the potential use of prehearing conferences becomes an important
element in rulemaking discovery. Indeed, even where only written procedures are contemplated, meetings with the various interest groups may often
be an effective tool in assuring a successful rulemaking proceeding.
(a) Prehearing conferences to deal with complex or obscure subject
matter. It has been recognized for years that pretrial conferences can act in
several ways to untangle complex and shapeless controversies. Particularly
in protracted litigation, pretrial conferences have been used to trim the
controversy down to size and to focus the proceeding on the major contested
issuesP In rulemaking, conferences may also be necessary just to identify
the issues raised by the proposed rule. 28 When an agency is contemplating
an initial expedition into a virgin policy area, the very nature of the issues
may be obscure. 29 Thus, the agency typically begins the rulemaking process
with less understanding than when it begins an administrative adjudication,
but will reach a result which may have substantially greater effect and will
be subject to only limited judicial scrutiny. 3 Conferences permit the agency
to assess the number and variety of questions raised by a proposed rule and
to determine what must be accomplished during the rulemaking process
before it can confidently issue a final rule. By uncovering subtle problems
and by defining or settling disputed issues, the prehearing conference can
serve to mark the very direction of rulemaking.
In addition, prehearing conferences can be used to define the issues on
which cross-examination will be afforded in rulemaking, either formal or
hybrid, which incorporates some degree of trial procedures. The prehearing
conference will help to define the specific issues that are appropriate for
testimonial devices and limit the use of those devices to the type of issues for

°

27. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, RECOMMENDED PROCEDURES FOR THE
TRIAL OF PROTRACfED CASES, 25 F.R.D. 351, 385-86 (1960). See Burch, Discovery Procedures
and Techniques Before Government Boards of Contract Appeals, 4 Pus. CONTRACf L.J. 119,
133-34 (1971).
28. See Hamilton 1165 (noting practical problems in using pre-trial conferences in FDA
formal rulemaking); Tomlinson 97. See generally JUDICIAL CoNFERENCE, supra note 27, at
386-87; Kaufman, Have Administrative Agencies Kept Pace With Modem Court-Developed
Techniques Against Delay?-A Judge's View, 12 AD. L. BULL. 103 (1959-60).
The EPA, for example, uses a "two round process." The first round serves to define the
controversy in order to develop the proposed rule, which is the subject of the second round.
Williams, "Hybrid Rulemaking" under the Administrative Procedure Act: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 42 U. CHI. L. REv. 401,451-54 (1975). The FAA, CAB, FPC and ICC apparently
use prehearing procedures similar to but less formalized than the prehearing conference
approach suggested here. Id. at 451 n.237.
·
29. Experimentation is one of the major benefits of rulemaking. See American Airlines,
Inc. v. CAB, 359 F.2d 624,633 (D.C. Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 843 (1966) ("It is the
kind of issue where a month of experience will be worth a year of hearings.").
30. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN THE SEVENTIES§ 658 (1976).
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which they are best suited. Groups with similar views on these issues can be
identified and representatives chosen to conduct the cross-examination. 31
Where the opportunity for cross-examination is not institutionalized, the
disclosure of issues may enable the participants to demonstrate a need for it
in the particular case.
The typically broad range of issues and interests involved in a rulemaking would therefore appear to make the prehearing conference almost
essential. However, an objection to the adaptation of this device to rulemaking could be based on the diversity and number of interested persons. In
most rulemaking situations, there are three general groups of potential
participants: the industry, the interested public and the agency. Ordinarily,
the proceeding is dominated by the industry and the agency. 32 But where the
rulemaking visibly affects the public, representatives from numerous segments of "the public" may participate. Thus, in some situations, rulemaking takes on the character of a multiple class action controversy. The diffuse
nature of the inquiry means that a prehearing conference will not be a
preliminary encounter of two opposing parties, but rather an interaction
among members of an amorphous mass of participants. Because the
rulemaking process itself is likely to be an informal exchange of information
and views, the prehearing conference could usurp these functions if all the
various interests were to participate. Thus, if prehearing conferences are to
be used in rulemaking, participation in the conferences must somehow be
allocated among narrowly defined interests. Yet, can anything be accomplished if all interested persons are not involved? The answer may be that
several prehearing conferences should be held between the agency staff and
the various interested groups. 33 Each interest group's problems can be
worked out separately between the group and the agency, and the prehearing
conference can serve to inform the agency of each group's point of view. In
this way, the controversies may at least be mitigated, if not resolved, as to
some groups.
31. Once these determinations are made, the workability of the hybrid process demands
that the participants adhere strictly to the restrictions. See Hamilton 1169.
32. See Hamilton 1182. The affected industry, however, is often a diverse group. See Yale
Note 832-33. For example, in an FrC food advertising rulemaking, the presiding officer
segregated the interested persons into the following groups: manufacturers and trade associations; the cholesterol industry (known affectionately as the "Fats and Fatty Acid people");
retailers; the health, natural and organic foods industry; advertising and media interests; and
consumers and consumer groups (the one non-industry group). In the Matter of Proposed Trade
Regulation Rule Concerning Food Advertising [16 C.F.R. Part 437], Public Record No. 215-40:
"Presiding Officer's Notice Identifying Groups with the Same or Similar Interests in the
Proceedings" (Apr. 22, 1976).
33. See Tomlinson 95: "Complex cases may require a series of prehearing conferences,
some of them quite informal and off the record."
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(b) Prehearing conferences and settlement. Traditionally, one of the
primary purposes of prehearing conferences is to facilitate consideration of
settlement. 34 Admittedly, the notion of settlement appears somewhat inconsistent with the concept of general public participation in policy-making
through rulemaking. Despite this apparent incompatibility, however, settlement may have a place in the overall rulemaking process.
Settlement always involves a weighing of the merits of the agreement
and the cost of continued litigation against the benefits to be lost through
concession. In rulemaking, the costs of proceeding are much less for those
adversely affected than in formal adjudication, and hence, the incentives to
settle are less apparent. 35
Justifying a settlement presents another practical obstacle. The government always has a problem in settlement negotiation, because it must weigh
''the public interest''-a nebulous term which affords ample opportunity for
second-guessing. It is also very difficult for government staff attorneys to
defend a settlement, especially on the basis of pessimistic estimates of the
chance of success. 36 A government admission that a proposal is weak .leaves
the agency open to criticism from both interested parties and the public. The
private party will contend that the rule never should have been proposed if
the government did not have a sound basis, and members of the public may
assert that the support for the proposed rule was deficient because of agency
incompetence. In addition, disagreement over the value of the concession is
inevitable as is the charge that one group is more disadvantaged by the
settlement than another.
Rulemaking magnifies these practical difficulties. In the first place,
rulemaking involves policy judgments rather than determinations of specific
factual issues. As a result, an agency negotiating a settlement immediately
falls into the role of a "co-conspirator" with the target industry. 37 Striking a
bargain on policy decisions delegated to the agency, it may be argued, is a
corruption of the agency's role in the legislative scheme. Often the agency is
charged by Congress with responsibility to fill in the policy details of
legislation. The agency can consult the industry and the public; indeed, that
is the purpose and value of rulemaking. But it is not part of the agency's
34. See Tomlinson 95.
35. The industry must nonetheless weigh the threat of ru)emaking. See Yale Note 819. The

more formalized the proceeding, the more the cost of the process alone will encourage both the
agency and the industry to compromise. Hamilton, Procedures, supra note 24, at 1287.
36. FDA bargains to avoid formal rulemaking have been alleged to be contrary to the public
interest. Hamilton, Procedures, supra note 24, at 1290.
37. Characterization of agencies as "captured" or clientele-oriented is one of the most
consistent complaints in administrative law. Actually, it is probably less a case of actual
corruption than of myopia bred from close association. W. GELLHORN & C. BYSE, supra note 5,
at 1020-21.
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legitimate function to bargain on the proper application of legislation to an
industry. 38 While it might concede some facts in exchange for concession on
other facts, and then agree to a settlement based on these concessions, it
cannot support ~ finding as to the best policy by agreement with the
industry. It must make its own independent policy judgment.
Furthermore, the necessary exclusiveness of participation in the settlement process deviates from the goal of permitting a wide range of contribution in rulemaking. The principles of rulemaking are not satisfied where
only a single interest is consulted, even if that interest is the one most
affected by the proposed rule. 39 Although the notice and comment procedures are intended to assure certain rights for the target of a rule, they are
also intended to provide input of adequate information for decisionmaking40 and avenues of participation for others who will be less directly
affected by the rule.
In spite of these conceptual problems, the settlement function of prehearing conferences can be important in rulemaking, and an effort should be
made to accommodate the participatory rights of all interest groups to
settlement. If the affected industry concedes the factual predicate of a
proposed rule, the disputed factual issues as between the industry and the
agency are resolved, and the parties to the settlement concede any participatory rights they might have. The settlement can then be legitimized by notice
of the agreement and an opportunity for written comment. 41 Participation in
addition to written comment hinges on the existence of "disputed issues of
material fact. " 42 Since the settlement presumes the resolution of such
issues, written comments must demonstrate why an oral or hybrid proceeding is necessary despite the settlement, and if no such showing is made, the
settlement may be finalized without resort to such procedures.
·
This abbreviated settlement procedure would appear to be permissible
despite its bypass of participatory rights. In the course· of a recent FI'C
rulemaking, for example, the target industry offered a settlement to the
38. Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, No. 75-1280 at 88 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 25, 1977):
[W]e are particularly concerned that the final shaping of the rules we are reviewing
here may have been by compromise among the contending industry forces, rather
than by exercise of the independent discretion in the public interest the Communication Act vests in individual commissioners.
39. See Yale Note 818.
40. See City of Chicago v. FPC, 458 F.2d 731, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S.
1074 (1972); Texaco, Inc. v. FPC, 412 F.2d 740, 744 (3d Cir. 1969); Pacific Coast European
Conference v. United States, 350 F.2d 197, 205 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 958 (1965).
41. The agency should provide evidence demonstrating that it dealt with the comments.
See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v.. NRC, 547 F.2d 633, 46 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Yale
Note 820-21, 824, 832 (noting that the SEC often opens informal settlements to comments after
it is virtually locked into the bargain).
42. FTC Improvement Act§§ 202(c), 15 U.S.C.A. § 57a(c) (Supp. 1976); Securities Ex·
change Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78f(e)(4) (Supp. 1976); K. DAVIS, supra note 30, §§ 6.01-.03. See
Walter Hohm & Co. v. Hardin, 449 F.2d 1009, 1016 (D.C. Cir. 1971) ("critical issues").
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agency. 43 The industry offered to stipulate to the disputed issues of material
fact in exchange for some concessions in the substance of the rule. The FrC
statute requires an oral hearing and some cross-examination where there are
disputed issues of material fact. 44 Where the agency finds no disputed issue,
as it would be justified in doing where it has reached an agreement with the
affected industry, these additional procedures are not required. The FrC
can, therefore, settle the case with notice of the proposed settlement and an
offer of an opportunity to make a written submission raising disputed factual
issues. If no one can raise a legitimate disputed issue of material fact, the
agency may dispense with further participation and make the necessary
policy judgment on the basis of stipulated facts. While the policy judgment
must be solely the decision of the agency, there is no reason why that
judgment cannot be tempered by the industry's settlement proposal and the
benefits which will accrue from industry cooperation. If the agency decides
not to accept the settlement, then, as in adjudication, the industry has the
right to insist on the full procedures due.
(c) Conferences in lieu of hybrid procedures. In his study of hybrid
rulemaking, Professor Williams discovered that agencies may use what he
termed ''inquiry conferences'' --conferences with special interest groups in
lieu of hybrid proceedings rather than in anticipation of such proceedings. 45
These conferences are intended to resolve certain issues which are of
concern to a particular interest group, usually the affected industry, through
exchanges between the agency staff and representatives of the interest. The
exchanges are to be substituted for testimonial rights such as crossexamination. Although many situations may arise where such conferences
would be appropriate, an agency considering the technique should exercise
caution to assure that there is no infringement of the participatory rights of
others who are not members of the affected industry.
(d) Preproposal conferences. At the opposite end of the spectrum is
the preproposal conference, which is used to explore the feasibility of some
form of regulation with the industry. 46 The advantage of such conferences is
43. In the Matter of Proposed Trade Regulation Rule on "Disclosure of Combustion
Characteristics in the Marketing and Certification of Cellular Plastics," Motion by Staff
Requesting Hearing Officer to Seek Commission Authorization to Accept Proposed Conditional Stipuation and Agreement (Aug. 1, 1975). Section 202 of the FfC Improvement Act, 15
U.S.C. § 57a (Supp. IV 1974), incorporates much of the best thinking relating to hybrid
rulemaking. Congress no doubt will use it as a model for the future. See Gordon v. New York
Stock Exchange, 422 U.S. 659, 680.81 (1975); 15 U.S.C.A. § 78f(e) (Supp. 1976) (recent
amendment to an SEC rulemaking provision). Therefore, study of the FfC's efforts in implementing this procedure is particularly valuable, and these efforts will be used as examples.
44. FfC Improvement Act§ 202(c) (1) (b), 15 U.S.C. § 57a(c)(1)(b) (Supp. IV 1974).
45. Williams, supra note 28, at 451-54.
46. See Hamilton 1162 (suggesting informal preliminary opinions by the agency as a means
of bringing out enforcement problems).
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that they permit the investigation of the subject without committing the
agency so far toward regulation that it is politically unable to withdraw. 47
The agency should be careful, however, to avoid institutionalized "informal" preproposal conferences. The rulemaking process is itself an investigative, policy-making technique. A rule proposal represents a determination that some problem exists. This determination is solely within the
province of the agency and should not involve the industry. The industry
should be consulted only to determine whether something can be done about
the regulatory problem that the agency finds to exist. Instead of holding
clandestine meetings with the industry prior to a proposal in order to enable
it to abandon unwise rulemaking without publicity, the agency should
recognize that it is not committed to every rule once it is proposed. The
value of public participation in policy decisions should outweigh whatever
pressure the agency feels to issue a rule once rulemaking is initiated. If the
record of the public rulemaking supports the abandonment of the regulation,
then the agency is not only justified in not promulgating a final rule, but is
compelled not to do so.
(e) Prehearing conferences to develop procedures. The prehearing
conference may also serve a function in rulemaking which it rarely serves in
adjudication-it can be used to arrive at particularized procedures in each
specific case. 48 This approach appropriately advances the concept of tailored
or hybrid procedures. Public and industry contributions to the determination
of what procedure is necessary will certainly enhance the procedural tailoring. In addition, procedure negotiated by the participants will be more likely
to withstand the scrutiny of judicial procedural review. Even where the
agency refuses to provide all of the procedures demanded by interested
persons, the negotiation process will promote careful consideration of alternative procedures. While a court may question the adequacy of the procedures selected, deference will generally be given to reasonable agency
procedural decisions. 49 Evidence of solicitation of participants' views and
conferences on procedures will surely add weight to the hybrid procedure
adopted by the agency.
The FTC's experience under the FTC Improvement Act has demonstrated the value of the prehearing conference in hybrid rule making. 50 Under
the Improvement Act, the presiding officers meet with the groups of par47. See Yale Note 837-38.
48. Cf. FED. R. C1v. P. 16(4) (pre-trial conference used to consider limitation on expert

witnesses).
49. See FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 423 U.S. 326, 333 (1976); FCC v.
Schrieber, 381 U.S. 279, 290 (1965), and cases cited therein.
50. Interview with William D. Dixon, Chief of Rulemaking Presiding Officers at the FTC
(Aug. 9, 1976).
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ticipants before the oral hearing to discuss procedure. This process alerts the
participants to how the hybrid procedure will operate. In addition, it permits
resolution of the major procedural question: the handling of crossexamination. The FrC Improvement Act process is pased on an initial
designation of certain issues as appropriate for testimonial hearing5 1 and
envisions limits on cross-examination. At the prehearing conference, the
presiding officer can find out which interest groups will cross-examine on
particular issues and whether several groups can be combined for purposes
of cross-examination. In this way, the presiding officer can maintain the
necessary control over the testimonial proceeding. 52 The prehearing conference also benefits participants by permitting exploration into testimony
which will be presented at the oral hearing, thus enabling them to plan their
approach to cross-examination.
In short, prehearing conferences have become an integral part of the
FrC's procedural engineering under the FrC Improvement Act. This experience indicates that prehearing conferences could be profitably employed
in most informal rulemaking to particularize procedures, especially where
some testimonial opportunity will be afforded.
(f) The exchange of information. Another traditional function of the
prehearing conferences is to foster the exchange of information. In trial
practice, the rise of the prehearing conference reflects the modern abhorrence of forensic gamesmanship. Conferences present the parties with an
opportunity, and' increasingly with compulsion, to disclose much of their
respective cases before trial in order to take the element of surprise out of the
litigation. One of the purposes of the Administrative Conference recommendation for extensive discovery in agency adjudications53 was to remove
surprise from such adjudication by encouraging the early exchange of
information. 54 Indeed, the Conference envisioned the exertion of consider51. Procedures and Rules of Practice for the Federal Trade Commission, 16 C.F.R. §1.12
(1977).
52. Consistent with the flexibility intended in the Improvement Act, some presiding officers have found it useful in many instances to bargain time limits in exchange for granting the
cross-examiners freedom to probe any issue. The consensus of FTC presiding officers seems to
be that, in cases which are not confined to specific questions of fact, it is virtually impossible to
determine whether a particular question is or will be relevant to a disputed issue. Interview with
Chief Presiding Officer William D. Dixon (Aug. 9, 1976) and with Presiding Officer Christopher
Keller (Aug. 10, 1976). FTC staff attorneys agree with this approach. Interview with FTC
Attorney Ellis Ratner (Aug. 11, 1976). For a discussion of the problems which arise with respect
to the issue designation approach of the FTC Improvement Act see Kestenbaum, Rulemaking
Beyond APA: Criteria for Trial-Type Procedures and the FTC Improvement Act, 44 GEo. WASH.
L. REV. 679 (1976).
53. See note 9 supra.
54. 1 K. DAVIS, supra note 1, § 8.15 at 392 (Supp. 1970): "The most important feature of
the recommendation is emphasis upon the prehearing conference as a device for directing
parties to exchange their evidentiary exhibits mid witness lists."
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able pressure on the parties in administrative adjudication to exchange
information prior to hearing. This has in fact occurred, and many agencies
now require the exchange of information prior to adjudication. 55
Avoiding the specter of participants arguing without complete access to
their adversaries' information is no less a worthy goal in informal rulemaking. Yet the probem takes on a substantially different gloss in the rulemaking context. A participant is not surprised to his disavantage by information
disclosed for the first time at an oral proceeding because the record remains
open so that additional evidence can be entered into the record afterwards. A
participant may be disadvantaged, however, when information is submitted
too near the closing of the record to permit meaningful comment. This
practice endangers the efficacy of the entire notice and comment procedure
and results in a poorer record for the rulemaking agency.
Unfortunately, agencies do not immediately place all the information
they possess on the public record, and there is no incentive for private
participants to submit written comment prior to the closing of the record.
Some mechanism should be established to assure that the participants will
come forward with information sufficiently early to elicit responsive comment. Prehearing conferences would be one way to accomplish this: as in
adjudication, the presiding agency employee should have the power to
compel participants, including the agency staff, to come forward with
information in sufficient time to permit comment. 56 A problem arises in
informal rulemaking when, as is often the case, there is no presiding officer.
Under these circumstances, the agency should instruct its staff to disclose
immediately all relevant information in its possession to insure the effective
solicitation of public participation. 57 In turn, the staff should be empowered
to pressure private participants, especially those directly interested, such as
the members of the affected industry, to submit their information early
enough to permit comment and rebuttal. The comment process will thereby
become a dialogue among interested persons and eliminate to some extent
the need for testimonial devices for disputing information in the rulemaking
record.
(g) Official notice. In adjudicatory proceedings, preheating conferences also serve to inform the parties of areas where official notice might be
55. See Tomlinson 96-97 (listing some of the agencies which provide for exchange of
information).
56. Tomlinson advocates a strong presiding officer to handle discovery in adjudications,
noting that the success of agency proceedings will depend on the competence of the presiding
officer. Id. at 97-98. The FTC experience to date suggests that the presiding officer can make a
significant difference in the success of hybrid rulemaking. See notes 50-52 supra and accompanying text.
57. See Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, No. 75-1280 at 94-98 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 25, 1977).
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taken. 58 As Professor Davis has suggested, official notice can often be taken
of "legislative facts"-"general facts which help the tribunal decide questions of law and policy and discretion"-which are at issue in an adjudicatory proceeding. 59 Since rulemaking involves primarily the making of policy
judgments, it is generally a search for such legislative facts. Therefore,
official notice could eliminate the conceptual need for a factual predicate to
support a rule. Since this result cannot be permitted, the practice of taking
official notice would seem to be of little utility.
There remain, however, two potential uses of the official notice device.
First, the agency, like a court, can take notice of those things which are
indisputable among reasonable people, such as generally accepted facts,
statutes or studies. 60 Second, the agency can use something in the nature of
official notice to distinguish those facts which it feels are genuinely in
dispute from those which it assumes are settled. The prehearing conference
presents an excellent opportunity for the presiding officer, or the agency
through its staff, to disclose the issues considered settled or worthy of only
abbreviated discussion and for the participants to disabuse the agency of any
notion that an issue is not controversial. 61
(h) Public or private prehearing conferences. One final question is
whether prehearing conferences must be ''on the record.' ' 62 Industry representatives would obviously prefer to meet with the agency staff off the
record. 63 The propriety of off-the-record conferences involves the conflict
between the value of closed-door candidness64 and the prospect of industry-agency deals which are never disclosed. Off the record candor, however,
serves little purpose in policy-making, which involves policy judgment
rather than fact-finding. Covert advocacy of policy, in fact, presents a real
danger of improper influence. In rulemaking, therefore, the agency should
rarely consider any material which it does not disclose to the public. 65
58. See Tomlinson 99-100.
59. 2 K. DAVIS, supra note 1, §15.02 at 353 (1958); see id. § 7.02; Davis, An Approach to
Problems in Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55 HARV. L. REV. 364, 402-10 (1942).
60. 'See 1 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE§ 200 (1975).
61. Pedersen, supra note 24, at 68 n.lll, noted the problems of adding newly discovered
supporting information to a rulemaking record. The official notice process may solve this
problem by enabling the agency to add the information with notice to participants and opportunity to rebut.
62. The APA clearly envisioned a "nonpublic investigatory proceeding." APA § 6(b), 5
U.S.C. § 555(c) (1970). See Yale Note 836-37 (discussing the pros and cons of candor engendered by off-the-record conferences).
63. See Williams, supra note 28, at 434 (discussing a situation in which the industry
representative was willing to exchange the right to cross-examine for an off-the-record
meeting with the staff). See also E. Griffiths Hughes, Inc. v. FrC, 63 F.2d 362 (D.C. Cir. 1933);
Gellhorn, The Treatment of Confidential Information by the Federal Trade Commission: The
Hearing, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 401, 404 (1968) (favoring open hearings).
64. See Williams, supra note 28, at 454.
65. Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, No. 75-1280 at 94-98 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 25, 1977).
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Although some factual information may justifiably be kept off the record, 66
policy arguments should never be presented in non-public conferences.
Thus, prehearing conferences, though they need not be open to the public,
should never be totally off the record. Where transcripts are not taken and
disclosed, minutes should be prepared for inclusion in the public record of
the rulemaking. The minutes should contain the exact terms of any bargains
struck between an interest group and the agency staff, 67 as well as a
summary of any material information disclosed or arguments presented in
the conferences. In general, there does not appear to be any reason why a
prehearing conference with specific groups of participants cannot be open to
public observation as long as there are limits for practical reasons on who
may contribute.

Depositions
Depositions in federal trials and agency adjudications are generally
limited to preserving testimony. 68 Therefore, there would seem to be no
reason to provide for depositions in rulemaking. 69 Written submissions can
become part of the rulemaking record without being introduced in an oral
proceeding. Theoretically, written material stands on the same footing as
oral evidence, and it would appear that, even after a hybrid proceeding, an
agency could base a rule on nothing more than written submissions.
Nonetheless, the requirement of hybrid procedures appears to include
an implicit assumption that oral testimony should be given greater weight
than written submissions, particularly when the oral testimony has been
"tested" by cross-examination. A careful participant might, therefore, wish
to preserve the testimony of an important witness through deposition because it would then stand on the same footing as the "evidence" developed
in a trial-type record. 70 Rather than encouraging such use of depositions, the
66. An exception should be made for rare instances of confidential information which
should be covered by a protective order or assurance of confidential treatment. See text
accompanying notes 186-93 infra.
67. Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 16 (requiring the court to disclose the agreements reached in pretrial conference).
68. See FED. R. CIV. P. 27(a)(l); Burch, supra note 27, at 151. See generally Mezines &
Parker, Discovery Before the Federal Trade Commission, 18 AD. L. REv. 55, 59-62 (1966)
(discussing FfC deposition practice); Stanford Comment 1043 (noting that prior practice and
legislative history of 5 U.S.C. § 556(c)(4), authorizing depositions "whenever the ends of
justice would be served thereby," suggest that the section was not intended to authorize
depositions for discovery purposes).
In administrative agency practice, the granting or denying of depositions rests in the
discretion of the presiding officer. APA § 7(b)(4}, 5 U.S.C. § 556(c)(4) (1970). See NLRB v.
C.H. Sprague & Son Co., 428 F.2d 938, 940 (1st Cir. 1970).
69. See Burch, supra note 27, at 154.
70. It is important to recognize that the terms "record" and "evidence" are not as limited
in rulemaking as in formal adjudication. In formal proceedings, the term "evidence" connotes
information which has passed through the procedural filters which limit variety and quantity. In
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agency involved in the rulemaking should inform the participants that
written and oral evidence are of equal stature71 and should suppress whatever preference it may have for oral testimony. The reliability of written
evidence can be demonstrated; it can be subjected to testing in the nature of
cross-examination if included in the public record early enough in the
proceeding to permit written comment and rebuttal. The primary function of
depositions, therefore, can be fulfilled in rulemaking by proper use of
written submissions.
Nor should depositions be used for discovery purposes in rulemaking.
The great number of potential participants and sources of relevant information make it necessary to curtail even written interrogatories, which are
much less burdensome and time consuming than oral depositions. 72
Witnesses
Although those who participate in rulemaking and witnesses in formal
adjudication are conceptually distinguishable, in practice they may be quite
similar, particularly when the rulemaking is a hybrid proceeding. The
Administrative Conference recommended the exchange of witness lists and
narrative summaries of testimony in formal proceedings. 73 Where rulemaking includes any oral proceeding, this recommendation is equally valid.
Where there is a hybrid proceeding with some possibility of crqssrulemaking, on the other hand, experience shows that immaterial and irrelevant information,
both factual and non-factual, often finds its way into the records. It has been impossible,
however, to purge the rulemaking lexicon of the term "evidence." Similarly, the term "record"
itself has an expanded scope in rulemaking, for a rule's "factual predicate," City of Chicago v.
FPC, 458 F.2d 731, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1074 (1972), contains great
quantities of information of varying value and relevancy. See, e.g., FfC Improvement Act§
202(e)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 57a(e)(3) (Supp. IV 1974): "The term 'evidence' . . . means any matter in
the rulemaking record"; id. §202(e)(l)(B); 15 U.S.C. § 57a(e)(l)(B): "The term 'rulemaking
record' means the rule, its statement of basis and purpose, the transcript . . . , any written
submissions, and any other information which the Commission considers relevant to such
rule."
71. See United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649 (1972) (Court reviewed a
record containing only written information submitted to an agency under 5 U.S.C. § 553).
72. See Hamilton 1172 (asserting that depositions are not desirable for FDA formal
rulemaking). Written interrogatories and written questions as to methodology should be preferred to oral testimony with cross-examination. This observation has special force in extrahearing oral proceedings.
73. Recommendation No. 21: Discovery in Agency Adjudication, supra note 9, § 3(b).
Hamilton, Rulemaking on the Record, 26 Fooo, DRUG & Cos. L.J. 627, 636 (1971) (a similar
recommendation for formal rulemaking at the FDA). The Jencks rule, requiring the government
to disclose to a criminal defendant all prior statements by prosecution witnesses in the possession of the prosecution which relate to the witnesses' testimony, see Jencks v. United States,
353 U.S. 657 (1957), is often applied to agency proceedings, and it is often expanded to require
disclosure of witness statements before the hearing. Ideally, there should be no Jencks problem
in rulemaking. The agency should place in the public record as soon as possible all information
in its possession, including witness statements.
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examination, such an exchange is essential. Even in hybrid rulemaking,
cross-examination will be closely restricted and some procedure for the
identification of witnesses and the disclosure of expected testimony permits
potential participants to determine which witnesses they will cross-examine
and how much cross-examination they wish of a particular witness. Such
disclosure also enables the presiding agency employee to designate representative groups and to judge how much cross-examination to permit. 74
Where no right of cross-examination is established in a particular agency's
rulemaking process, the disclosure of witness identity and summary of
testimony may form the basis on which one seeking the right to crossexamine can advocate the need for some cross-examination of a particular
witness. 75
The FTC uses a procedure involving prehearing discussions and the
disclosure of witnesses and testimony in conducting rulemaking under its
model hybrid procedure. In fact, it has proven to be the only method by
which rulemaking can be conducted under the Improvement Act. FTC
presiding officers have been able to manage cross-examination successfully
because they know what to expect and how much. In short, this process
gives the presiding officers the control necessary to make testimonial procedures practical in rulemaking. 76
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may discover ''the
identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable
matter.' m A participant in rulemaking should be able to obtain this same
information from the agency. A rulemaking agency should be required to
disclose the identity of all persons who have special knowledge about the
subject matter. In addition, unlike the federal judicial practice, the agency
should be required at the earliest possible time to disclose those persons
74. See Tomlinson 119-20.
75. See Virgin Islands Hotel Ass'n v. Virgin Islands Water & Power Auth., 476 F.2d
1263, 1268-69 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1067 (1973) (cross-examination denied because of
failure to demonstrate inadequacy of written questions). Compare Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. v. NRC, 547 F.2d 633, 643-44 n.25 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (proffer adequate to support
some additional procedures) with National Asphalt Pavement Ass'n v. Train, 539 F.2d 775,
782-83 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (proffer failed to support additional procedures).
76. A high FTC official suggested to the author that the FTC Improvement Act hybrid
procedure has been made to work by brute force: the presiding officers have made it work
through a triumph of will. Interview with assistant to the general counsel, Barry Rubin, (Aug. 9,
1976).
77. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(l). Use of the word "matter" rather than "fact" indicates that the
inquiry may include persons who might disclose opinions. See Panzer, The New Federal
Discovery Rules in Civil Cases, in NEW FEDERAL CIVIL DISCOVERY SOURCEBOOK 216 (\V,
Treadwell ed. 1972). See also C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 400 (3d ed. 1970) (stating
that it has been routinely held that a party may be required to disclose the names of "occurrence witnesses").
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whom it may call as witnesses.78 In informal rulemaking, however, private
individuals should not be required to disclose the ide~tity of all those having
information relating to the rule, but should at some time before the hearing
disclose the identity of persons who will submit either written or oral
presentations on their behalf.
Federal Rule 26(b)(4), which provides for the discovery of an opposing party's experts, could also be adapted to rulemaking. The rule draws a
distinction between experts expected to be called as witnesses and experts
who are consulted in preparation for trial, and precludes discovery of
experts who are informally consulted, but not retained or specially employed for the litigation. 79 It provides a broad range of discovery of those
experts to be called as witnesses, but such discovery is limited to interrogatories. 80 In order to question an expert who is merely consulted, the
opposing party must make "a showing of exceptional circumstances under
which it is impracticable for the party seeking discovery to obtain facts or
opinions on the same subject by the other means. " 81 The major impediment
to adapting similar discovery to rulemaking is the absence of the limiting
concept of "party." On the other hand, because of the nature of most
rulemaking, a special effort should be made to provide expert testimony or
written submissions. Thus, rather than relying on such private discovery,
the agency staff should make a special effort to uncover and disclose the
identities of experts in the field. In order to uncover such experts, the agency
staff should request that the "more interested" participants, for instance the
regulated industry, disclose experts whom they perceive as being able to
contribute. The right of interested persons to question experts who do not
volunteer to contribute should, however, be severely limited, particularly
when the expert does not intend to testify either on behalf of an interest or on
his own. In these situations, private discovery should be permitted only
under the "exceptional circumstances" standard set forth above. Where an
interested party demonstrates that an expert will be of assistance, the agency
itself should seek out and obtain information from the expert, particularly
where the interested person does not have the resources to pay an expert
fee. 82 In this way, the agency takes on the expense of expert advice in
78. The agency should, however, be able to claim the same privilege against revealing
informants available in adjudication. See Stewart & Ward, FI'C Discovery: Depositions, The
Freedom of Information Act and Confidential Informants, 37 ANTITRUST L.J. 248,258 (1968).
The informant privilege, though, must yield to a sho~ing of "good cause for revelation," see
Gellhorn 169-70. Cf. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM ON THE 1974 AMENDMENTS TO THE
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION Acr 10 (1975).
79. See RULES ADVISORY COMM. 504
80. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4)(A)(i).
81. Id. 26(b)(4)(B).
82. The Federal Rules require payment of expert fees. Id. 26(b)(4)(C). An expert should
not be expected to donate the very services from which he makes a living.
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formulating its policy. This imposition seems justified since, unlike adjudication in which individual interests are more directly at stake, rulemaking
furthers the agency's interest by permitting it to carry out a duty assigned by
Congress.

Written Interrogatories
Written interrogatories have proven to be an inexpensive discovery
and for that reason alone they would be useful in informal rulemaking. But there is another compelling reason for incorporating interrogatory
procedure into the rulemaking process: written interrogatories may be an
essential alternative to compelling a greater shift to trial-type, testimonial
procedures. 84 Written submissions are the backbone of informal rulemaking, even where some trial procedures are permitted. Nonetheless, there
must be a method for testing the submission or for exploring the written
comments in greater depth. Written interrogatories can be used for this
purpose.
tool, 83

Use of written interrogatories could greatly reduce the need for crossexamination. Although cross-examination of experts has been thought to be
particularly useful, 85 written exchange might often produce more reliable
information. 86 The record formed by interrogatories would no doubt be
more direct and understandable than a record formed by transcripts of oral
questions. Moreover, written questions would create the opportunity for
83. See Tomlinson 121.
84. See International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 630-31 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(written questions may substitute for cross-examination); accord, O'Donnell v. Shaffer, 491
F.2d 59,61-62 (D.C. Cir. 1974). But see Currie, Rulemaking Under the Illinois Pollution Law, 42
U. CHI. L. REv. 457, 471-72 (1975) (asserting that, for state pollution control agency, trial
procedures were more efficient than written interrogatories).
85. See Robinson, supra note 22, at 521-23; see also Clagett, Informal ActionAdjudication-Rulemaking: Some Recent Developments in Federal Administrative Law, 1971
DUKE L.J. 51, 79 (suggesting that an expert may be profitably cross-examined even on
legislative facts). But see Hamilton 1156 (asserting that the prospect of cross-examination has
alienated experts from the FDA).
86. See Prettyman, How to Try a Dispute Under Adjudication by an Administrative
Agency, 45 VA. L. REv. 179, 190 (1959). Expert witnesses do not always make a strong personal
impression on the stand. Yet given the sanctuary of carefully considered written answers, they
will display the value of their opinion, not in their demeanor, but in the quality of their
scholarship. Professor Wigmore, although characterizing cross-examination as "the greatest
legal engine ever invented for the discovery of the truth," conceded that it may do more harm
than good with respect to testimony of experts. J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §1367 (J. Chadbourn
rev. ed. 1974). See Up john Co. v. Finch, 422 F.2d 944,955 (6th Cir. 1970) ("No amount of ..•
cross-examination can change scientific studies and data . . . . "). But see Robinson, supra
note 22, at 521-24; Spritzer, Uses of the Summary Power to Suspend Rates: An Examination of
Federal Regulatory Agency Practices, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 39, 95-97 (1971) (pointing out
countervailing considerations which might support cross-examination of experts).
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exchange between opposing experts rather than between an attorney and an
expert. The caliber of the exchange would certainly be enhanced if, instead
of educating an attorney so that he might cross-examine, the expert communicated directly with his counterpart. 87
In judicial proceedings and formal agency proceedings, interrogatories
must be directed at "parties. " 88 In rulemaking, if all participants are
considered ''parties'' for purposes of discovery. then anyone who comments will face the possibility of receiving a request to answer interrogatories. If uncontrolled authority to serve interrogatories is given to
participants, as under the Federal Rules, 89 the result could be extremely
detrimental. Procedural control should be maintained by routing interrogatories through the agency or its delegate. The presiding officer or an
employee in charge of rulemaking discovery should screen the requests to
eliminate redundancy and other unnecessary burdens. 90
Control of interrogatories, however, should not be left to ad hoc·
determinations. A rational, controlled program for making interrogatories
available demands that the agency develop guidelines for their issuance.
These guidelines should establish general categories of substantive content
which will or will not be subject to interrogatories. The guidelines should
also define the types of participants who will be subject to interrogatories.
Certainly some participants, such as an industry trade association, are more
interested than others and can be fairly expected to answer interrogatories,
upon direction from the agency. In general, interrogatories should be permissible only when directed at significantly interested persons: those immediately affected by the rule who are active in getting comments into the
record and who indicate that they intend to participate fully in the proceeding. In addition, those subject to interrogatories should be categorized
according to their ability to answer. Interrogatories should perhaps be
permitted only to such larger participants as corporations, trade associa. tions, groups representing the public and the agency.
Interested persons who are the targets of interrogatories can, of course,
87. In support of pre-trial exchange of information produced by experts, the Federal Rules
Advisory Committee noted: "The lawyer even with the help of his own experts frequently
cannot anticipate the particular approach his adversary's expert will take or the data on which
he will base his judgment on the stand." RuLES ADVISORY CoMM. 503.
88. FED. R. Civ. P. 33 (a) (interrogatories may be served upon "any other party"); see
Tomlinson 121.
89. Interrogatories may be served directly on a party without leave of the court. FED. R.
CIV. P. 33(a).
90. See Kroll & Maciszewski, Pre-trial Discovery: Change in the Federal Rules, DiscovERY RULES SOURCEBOOK, supra note 77, at 206.
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rmmmize the burden by refusing to answer the questions. Considerable
incentive to respond will result from a calculation of the effect the refusal to
answer questions may have on the weight of the person's submission or
testimony and from the psychological drive to demonstrate the soundness of
one's submission. But ultimately, there is no compulsion to respond unless
the agency has formalized the proceeding so as to create some right to have
interrogatories answered. Thus, the formality of the particular rulemaking
may be an appropriate index of how much control the agency should
exercise over interrogatories. Where the proceeding is very informal, the
person's refusal to answer might be sufficient to prevent overwhelming
interrogatories, but where a hybrid procedure includes some formal right to
discovery, including interrogatories, substantial agency control is
necessary. 91
When the interrogatories are directed at the agency, there is a need to
prevent delving too far into the decision-maker's mental processes. 92 The
Administrative Conference recommendation would limit interrogatories in
agency adjudication to agency employees with knowledge of relevant
facts. 93 This approach is as appropriate for rulemaking as it is for adjudication. Whereas rulemaking is a policy-formulating device and hence the
thinking of the agency may be important to a participant, disclosure of the
agency's thinking should be a function of the notice requirement rather than
discovery. 94 On the other hand, factual questions directed at the staff should
be answered. 95 In addition, because interrogatories to staff members, par91. Even in trials, there may be considerable freedom to refuse to answer interrogatories.
See Huff v. N.D. Cass Co., 468 F.2d 172, 176 (5th Cir. 1972), modified on other grounds, 485
F.2d 710 (5th Cir. 1973); Bell v. Swift & Co., 283 F.2d 407, 408·09 (5th Cir. 1960). Techniques
for enforcing interrogatories vary. See Stanford Comment 1076; FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(d).
Under the Federal Rules, the party serving the interrogatory must move for enforcement rather
than the answering party moving to quash. FED. R. CJV. P. 33(a). See RULES ADVISORY COMM.
522-23. Because the proposal herein envisions initial agency involvement in judging the propriety of an interrogatory, failure to answer will be tantamount to ignoring an administrative order.
92. See United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 422 (1941); J.H. Rutter Rex Mfg. Co. v.
NLRB, 473 F.2d 223, 234 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 822 (1973). But see Note,
"Mental Process" Privilege Prevents Discovery of Existence of Agency Head's StatutorilyRequired Personal Decision, 50 WASH. L. REv. 739 (1975). Compare Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971) (permitting some inquiry into the mental process in
the absence of agency reasoning necessary for review) with Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 143
(1973) (requiring reliance on "contemporary explanation" if available).
93. See Report of the Comm. on Compliance and Enforcement Proceedings in Support of
Recommendation No. 21, supra note 9, at 629-31.
94. See text accompanying note 204 infra.
95. See Gellhorn 176. In addition, interrogatories to the agency may be necessary to
uncover the existence or location of documents which can then be requested. See Tomlinson
121.
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ticularly experts, will often include matters of opinion, questions requiring
staff opinion should be permitted as long as the opinions called for are
intertwined with the factual inquiry, 96 and as long as the expression will not
disclose the mental process of the ultimate decision-maker. 97

Requests for Admission
Admissions perform a modest role in agency adjudicatory discovery98
and generally have little place in rulemaking. However, admissions as to
some issues would certainly expedite the rulemaking process and focus
attention on disputed material issues.
Where some trial procedures are provided in both hybrid and formal
rulemaking, requests for admission, especially those from the agency, need
not go so far as to ask for concessions on the truth of facts. Rather, an
interested group may be asked to admit that an issue is not a factual one or is
not major in the decision-making. If agreement can be reached that an issue
is a policy judgment or question of law, then the agency is justified in not
providing testimonial procedures and may decide the issue on the basis of
participation by oral argument or written comment. The requirement of
some trial procedure has generally been limited to "crucial," "critical" or
"material" factual issues, and an agency need not provide such procedure
for minor or peripheral factual issues. Consequently, an admission that the
resolution of certain facts is not crucial to the outcome of the rulemaking
would justify limiting participants to writteQ. proof as to that fact.
The use of admissions in informal rulemaking does present some
practical difficulties. As with settlement, the major problem is the absence
of two clearly identifiable adverse interests. Getting one group of participants to admit to an issue may not eliminate that issue as to other participants.
Nonetheless, there may be instances where it will be profitable to ask one
96. Under the Federal Rules, interrogatories may involve "opinion or contention that
relate to fact or the application of law to fact," FED. R. C1v. P. 33(b); See RULES ADVISORY
COMM. 524, and may inquire into questions of legal theories where intertwined with factual
questions, id. at 524. The Federal Rule provision may not always be applied to administrative
interrogatories. See Wurlitzer Co. v. EEOC, 50 F.R.D. 421 (N.D. Miss. 1970).
97. These opinions should not be binding on the agency in any way. Except where there is
"exceptional reliance," answers to interrogatories do not limit proof. RULES ADVISORY COMM.
524.
98. See Tomlinson 124. The Federal Rules Advisory Committee noted two purposes to be
served by admissions: "first to facilitate proof with respect to issues that cannot be eliminated
from the case, and secondly, to narrow the issues by eliminating those that can be." RULES
ADVISORY COMM. 531-32. A request for admission may even focus on ultimate disputed facts.
Kroll & Maciszewski, supra note 90, at 211.

318

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1977:295

group to admit to certain issues. Where this is properly done, the agency
may be justified in confining further discussion on that issue to written
comment or even to written submission as to why the issue should not be
resolved by the admission.
A corollary to the use of admissions is the agency's authority to
discipline those who refuse to admit to an issue which should not be in
dispute. Such authority appears inconsistent with the informal rulemaking
process. The amorphous nature of the rulemaking controversy requires the
agency to designate which issues are of crucial importance, and a special
interest's willingness to admit to the resolution of a question will certainly
be relevant to this determination. But it is the power of the agency to define
the issue of concern, not the fact that an admission was made, which is of
primary significance in the rulemaking context.
As an alternative to adjudicatory-type requests for admissions, proposed initial findings by the agency could accompany the publication of the
proposed rule. The initial findings should disclose assumed facts and shift to
participants the burden of demonstrating that the assumptions are in error or,
at least, that there is substantial controversy as to a fact which the proceeding must attempt to resolve. 99 Rulemaking is a method for informing the
agency, and this initial finding procedure can serve to disclose the areas
where the agency most needs information. The agency will also be able to
control the course of the proceeding and limit the issues that are considered
to be in dispute.

Compulsory Process
(a) Subpoena power in general. At present, the failure of an agency
to provide for compulsory process, even in formal adjudication, does not
violate due process, 100 nor is there any general statutory guarantee making
compulsory process available. 101 The APA does not guarantee compulsory
process, or empower agencies to issue subpoenas, but provides only that a
subpoena shall be issued to a party where an agency already has subpoena
99. The APA provision that the proponent of a rule bears the burden of proof applies only
to rules which must be made on a record, APA §7(c), 5 U.S.C. §556(d) (1970). This requirement
would not seem to apply to informal rulemaking.
100. See Low Wah Suey v. Backus, 225 U.S. 460, 470.71 (1912); Ubiotica Corp. v. FDA,
427 F.2d 376, 381 (6th Cir. 1970).
101. See NLRB v. Seine & Line Fishermen's Union of San Pedro, 374 F.2d 974, 982 (9th
Cir. 1967) (refusal to issue a subpoena not necessarily prejudicial); Campbell v. Eastland, 307
F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1962) (trial court abused its discretion by rendering judgment for taxpayer
simply because the government would not allow discovery). But see FTC v. United States Pipe
& Foundry Co., 304 F. Supp. 1254, 1259 (D.D.C. 1969) (in FTC adjudication, party has right to
a subpoena "on a showing of general relevance and reasonable scope of the evidence sought").
See generally I K. DAVIS, supra note I, § 8.15 (1958); K. DAVIS, supra note 30, at 298.
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authority. 102 This provision merely attempts to place the agency and private
parties on an equal footing. 103
However, this equality is somewhat illusory, because agencies may
have other investigative powers to compel disclosure of information or filing
of reports which are not available to private persons. 104 The APA expressly
102. APA § 6(c), 5 U.S.C. § 555(d) (1970).
Uniformly, agencies do not have power to enforce their own subpoenas, but must seek
enforcement in the courts. The Constitution and considerations of fundamental fairness require
this bifurcation of power. United States v. Security State Bank and Trust, 473 F.2d 638, 641
(5th Cir. 1973). See Stanford Comment 1076. Thus, one can receive interlocutory review of an
agency subpoena merely by refusing to comply. However, the degree of judicial deference to
agency subpoena requests suggests that this review is often not worth the time and expense.
See note 108 infra.
Sanctions for failure to comply with a discovery order are unclear under APA § 9(a), 5
U.S.C. § 558(b) (1970), and. depend on individual enabling acts. See Stanford Comment 1051,
1054-55. In addition to judicial enforcement through the contempt power, administrative sanctions for failure to respond to discovery include refusal to permit testimony from the disobedient party on pertinent issues and decision of pertinent issues adversely to the disobedient
party. See Burch, supra note 27, at 181. See also NLRB v. C.H. Sprague & Son Co., 428 F.2d
938, 942 (1st Cir. 1970) (agency may enforce subpoena by refusing to permit cross-examination
"with reference to any matter which could have been produced by complying with the
subpoena").
Most agencies with compulsory process procedures also provide interested persons the
right to move to quash a subpoena issued by its staff. If an agency has a procedure for testing
discovery orders through a motion to quash, that procedure must be exhausted before a written
interrogatory can be challenged in court. See National Lawyers Guild v. Brownell, 225 F.2d
552, 558 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 927, reh. denied, 351 U.S. 990 (1956). Also, a
third party will not be permitted to intervene in an effort to quash the subpoena unless it has
some privilege or proprietary interest in the proceeding. See Donaldson v. United States, 400
U.S. 517 (1971) (taxpayer cannot intervene in IRS enforcement proceedings against his employer in order to quash subpoena for records affecting his own tax liability); United States v.
Moore, 485 F.2d 1165, 1168 (5th Cir. 1973) (where the subpoena is issued to one who will
adequately defend the third party's interest, there is no prejudice in denying third party
intervention).
Even where there is no provision for motion to quash, APA § 6(d), 5 U.S.C. § 555(e) (1970),
guarantees the right to petition the agency and the right to an explanation for a denial of the
petition. This provision should provide the basis for a petition to quash a discovery order. A
motion to quash should always precede a refusal to comply because by this means the agency
will be forced to disclose its arguments for enforcing the subpoena prior to the judicial
proceeding. Often an effective motion to quash or expression of intent to refuse to comply will
serve best when used in conjunction with a clear intent to compromise. Agency staff will often
agree to lesser access to avoid going through all the procedural steps necessary to enforce a
subpoena fully.
103. The purpose of this provision is to make agency subpoenas available to private
parties to the same extent as to agency representatives . . . . It should be emphasized that Section 6(c) [5 U.S.C. § 555(d)] relates only to existing subpoena
powers conferred upon agencies; it does not grant power to issue subpoenas to
agencies which are not so empowered by other statutes.
APA MANUAL supra note 8, at 67. See Tomlinson 104.
104. See Tomlinson 124-25. See also Papercraft Corp. v. FTC, 307 F. Supp. 1401 (W.D. Pa.
1970) (participant has no right to reports furnished to agency under authority separate from
subpoena power, even though participant alleged that the FTC investigative powers had been
used as "tool of litigation" in the particular agency adjudication).
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recognizes that many agencies have powers to make investigative demands
which are separate and distinct from any compulsory process which may be
available in conjunction with specific proceedings. 105 The investigative
powers of many agencies, especially the large rulemaking agencies, may be
exceedingly broad, 106 and the law permits very little judicial interference
with those powers. 107 Whereas an agency can satisfy its informational needs
through its investigative powers, the participants, even in formal proceedings, must rely on the agency's discovery rules to find a means of obtaining
information. 108 Therefore, the targets of a rulemaking will not likely have
the s~e access to information as the agency.
105. APA § 6(b), 5 U.S.C. § 555(c) (1970).
106. While the APA limits investigative demands by the language "as authorized by law,"
many agencies have broad authority to issue investigative requests. See, e.g., United States v.
Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950) (an agency's investigative request will be enforced
even if motivated by "nothing more than official curiosity"); EEOC v. University ofN.M., 504
F.2d 1296, 1303 (lOth Cir. 1974) (administrative subpoenas enforceable unless "plainly incompetent or irrelevant to any lawful purpose"); United States v. Marshall Durbin & Co., 363 F.2d
I, 5 (5th Cir. 1966) (FI'C may subpoena records pertinent to an investigation which are in
possession of third person who is not the subject of such investigation); Adams v. FI'C, 296
F.2d 861, 867 (8th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 864 (1962) ("broadness alone is not
sufficient justification to refuse enforcement of a subpoena so long as the material sought is
relevant"); cf. FI'C v. Gladstone, 450 F.2d 913, 915 (5th Cir. 1971) (even where administrative
· subpoena enforced by court may be overbroad, one who destroys subpoenaed documents is
guilty of criminal contempt). The burden of showing that an agency subpoena is unreasonable
remains with the respondent. See Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517,527 (1971); United
States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 58 (1964).
Constitutional challenges to administrative subpoenas, based on the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination, are exceedingly difficult to maintain. See Fisher v. United
States, 425 U.S. 391, 400-02 (1976) (regardless of whether documents would have been
privileged in hands of taxpayers, IRS could subpoena documents transferred to taxpayer's
attorney in connection with an investigation); Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 536
(1971) ("an internal revenue summons may be issued in aid of an investigation if it is issued in
good faith and prior to a recommendation for criminal prosecution"). This traditional deference
may be ripe for questioning. In CAB v. United Airlines, Inc., 542 F.2d 394 (7th Cir. 1976), the
Seventh Circuit questioned the CAB's plenary inspection authority to search several broad
categories of the carrier's records. Relying in large part on Burlington Northern, Inc. v. ICC,
462 F.2d 280, 287-88 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 891 (1972), the court found that the right
to inspect was not unlimited and that an agency must describe the purpose for inspection so that
a court can review its appropriateness. The court cited California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416
U.S. 21, 62 (1974), in which it had been pointed out that the challenged regulations "[did] not
authorize indiscriminate rummaging among the records of the plaintiffs." The Seventh Circuit
noted that some limited "expectation of privacy" did exist for a corporation. "In summary, the
decisions uniformly require that an investigative demand be reasonably definite and reasonably
relevant to some proper investigative purposes. The Board cites no case, and we have found
none, holding that any statute has conferred a general warrant power on any agency." Id. at
399. While the case involved the problem of inspection, the thrust of the opinion displays a
closer examination of the agency's investigative purpose than is usual.
107. See Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 214 (1946); FI'C v. Feldman,
532 F.2d 1092, 1095 (7th Cir. 1976).
108. SeeK. DAVIS, supra note 30, at§ 8.15.

Vol. 1977:295]

DISCOVERY IN RULEMAK.ING

321

In addition, it is doubtful that the guarantee of equal treatment applies
to informal rulemaking. The subpoena provision is contained in the "ancillary'' section of the APA 109 which has rather general application in accordance with applicability of each individual subsection. 110 Thus, while it is
clear that certain provisions of the section could apply to rulemaking, it does
not necessarily follow that each subsection applies to rulemaking. Although
there is no explicit limiting language, the subponena subsection suggests
that it was intended to apply only to formal proceedings. The use of the term
"party" in subsection (d) compels this conclusion. While the APA defini- .
tion of "party" is broad, 111 the notion of "party" does not coincide with the
concept of informal rulemaking. 112 This dissonance is demonstrated by the
APA drafters' use of "interested persons," not "parties," in section 553. 113 ·
A party is a person who is particularly focused upon in a formal proceeding.
One who is not directly connected with a proceeding must move to intervene
and prove sufficient interest to become a party before he may participate. 114
In rulemaking, participation is open to anyone, and the term "party," with
its connotation of limited access to the proceeding, is inappropriate; thus the
language of subsection (d) implies that it was not to apply to informal
rulemaking. 115
109. APA § 6, 5 U.S.C. § 555 (1970).
110. The intent of the provision was clearly to promulgate miscellaneous procedural
categories:
Section [555] defines various procedural rights of private parties which may be
incidental to rulemaking, adjudication, or the exercise of any other authority.
APA MANUAL, supra note 8, at 61; accord, S. Doc. No. 248, supra note 8, at 263. The Senate
report's title refers to "incidental or miscellaneous rights, powers imd procedures." Id. at 204.
In addition, the definition of agency proceeding, APA § 12(g), 5 U.S.C. § 551(12) (1970),
includes all rulemaking.
Ill. APA § 2(b), 5 U .S.C. § 551(3) (1970).
112. See Verkuil, Judicial Review of Informal Rulemaking, 60 VA. L. REv. 185,236 (1974).
In Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 469 F.2d 1116, 1119-20 (2d Cir. 1972), the concurring judge, in an
opinion concurred in by another judge on the panel, found that "party" in section 555 referred
to the context of a formal proceeding and not informal negotiation. He relied on the specific
provision in section 554(c) for informal negotiation, and the same analysis would serve to
exclude section 553 informal rulemaking procedures. The third judge seemed to lean in the
same direction but felt the issue should not be decided until the administrative remedies had
been exhausted. Id. at 1117 n.5.
113. APA § 4, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970).
114. However, intervention in administrative proceedings has become much easier. Public
Participation in Administrative Hearings (Recommendation No. 71-6), 1 C.P.R. § 305.71-6A
(1977). Leading cases liberalizing intervention include Office of Cunication of United Church of
Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966); cert. denied sub nom. Consolidated Edison Co. v.
Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf., 384 U.S. 941 (1966). The trend-setting scholarly works
include Crampton, The Why, Where and How of Broadened Public Participation in the Administrative Process, GEo. L.J. 525 (1972); Shapiro, Some Thoughts on Intervention Before Courts,
AgenCies, and Arbitrators, 81 HARV. L. REV. 721 (1968).
115. But see A.O. Smith Corp. v. FTC, 396 F. Supp. 1125, 1133 (D. Del. 1975), vacated on
other grounds, 530 F.2d 515 (3d Cir. 1976) ( 5 U.S.C. § 553, referring to "interested persons"
rather than "parties," does not preclude application of 5 U.S~C. § 555(d)).
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Practical considerations suppqrt this semantic argument. The Administrative Conference has found that compulsory process is inappropriate in
informal proceedings in general and rulemaking in particular.II 6 The major
difficulty in providing compulsory process in rulemaking is the uncontrollable numbers of potential participants. Rulemaking by a major federal
agency may have national, and even international impact, and the agency's
subpoena power is often coextensive with the reach of the proceeding. II7 To
permit all participants in a rulemaking access to subpoenas could result in an
oppressive convulsion of compulsory process. 118
On the other hand, compulsory process cannot be totally excluded from
the participatory rights incorporated into rulemaking. 119 Discovery is necessary to effective participation: it permits an interested person to defend his
interest and, by maximizing the ability to represent an interest, it assures
greater information on which an agency may make a decision. Compulsory
process not only provides a tool whereby an interested person may ga,ther
more information, it also permits an interested person the right to confront
the information which is to be used against him. The Supreme Court has
mandated that the targets of all. varieties of informal administrative action be
given such an opportunity, IZO and access to compulsory process would seem
Section 7 of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 556 (I970), which clearly applies to proceedings on the
record (hence neither informal adjudication nor informal rulemaking), provides that the presiding officer shall issue subpoenas authorized by Jaw, 5 U.S.C. § 556(c)(2) (I970), and take
depositions, 5 U.S.C. § 556(c)(4) (I970). There can be no doubt that this section applies only to
formal adjudication and rulemaking.
I I6. Report of the Comm. on Compliance and Enforcement Proceedings in Support of
Recommendation No. 21, supra note 9, at 582. The Administrative Conference recommended
that the APA be amended t_o authorize explicitly agency subpoena power and guarantee the
right to compulsory process, but only in proceedings covered by sections 7 and 8, 5 U.S.C. §§
· 556-57 (I970). Discovery in Agency Adjudication (Recommendation No. 70-4), supra note 9, at
46-47. See ';['omlinson 142 (expanding the recommendation to adjudications which are within the
spirit if not the letter of these provisions). An ABA resolution would have extended subpoena
power to informal as well as formal adjudication. The 12 ABA Recommendations for Improved
Procedures for Federal Agencies, 24 Ao. L. REV. 389, 408 (I972).
117. See FfC v. Browning, 435 F.2d 96, 99-IOI (D.C. Cir. 1970) (FfC subpoena can have
nationwide service); FMC v. DeSmedt, 366 F.2d 464,468-69 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 974
(I966) (administrative service may extend beyond the U.S.).
liS. Cf. Papercraft Corp. v. FfC, 472 F.2d 927, 929 (7th Cir. I973) (upholding FfC refusal
to issue subpoenas duces tecum to 550 companies where there were other methods of developing the data).
119. The legislative history of the FfC Improvement Act suggests the availability of subpoena in that hybrid rulemaking procedure. The FfC effectuated this suggestion in its procedural
rules. I6 C.F.R. § 1.13(d)(6) (1977).
One court has held that an agency may not provide for compulsory process without
statutory authorization. FMC v. Anglo-Canadian Shipping Co., 335 F.2d 255 (9th Cir. 1964).
This opinion has been severely criticized, Galland, A Note on Maritime Discovery, 19 Ao. L.
REV. 119 (1966), and is probably not good Jaw. See FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279 (I965).
120. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). See
generally Note, Procedural Due Process After Goss v. Lopez, I976 DUKE L.J .. 409.
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to be a necessary complement to this right. 121
Even though compulsory process is necessary to effective participatory
rights and can enhance the rulemaking record by increasing the availability
of information, compulsory process should only be required where its
detrimental effects can be mitigated. 122 Some measure of control is provided
by the APA which, unlike the Federal Rules, 123 authorizes agencies to
require a showing of reasonable scope and relevance prior to the issuance of
a subpoena. 124 This general standard, however, does not seem sufficient in
the context of rulemaking. Because of the number and variety of participants, some subpoenas which are both clearly relevant and limited in scope
should not be issued. 'Pie availability of subpoenas must be substantially
narrower. Agencies which do a considerable amount of rulemaking should
articulate when compulsory process will be made available through restrictive guidelines which are carefully drafted in light of their particular
proceedings.
Furthermore, where there is to be compulsory process in rulemaking, it
cannot be permitted without some initial screening. However, it may not be
feasible to rely on the presiding officer to perform this function, since unlike
Neither Goss nor Goldberg arose in the context of rulemaking, but both cases set forth
certain basic requirements for due process in informal proceedings. In Connecticut State Dep't
of Pub. Welfare v. HEW, 448 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1971), the state of Connecticut, which was
challenging an informal action by the federal government, alleged that the HEW procedure was
unfair because there was no provision for discovery by deposition or interrogatory and the
hearing officer lacked the power to subpoena witnesses, papers and other evidence. Noting that
the issues were not ones of adjudicative fact but questions of law, the Second Circuit cited
Goldberg for the proposition that due process is not an unvarying standard but depends on the
interests affected. Id. at 212. The court apparently believed that, since the aggrieved party (the
state) had been given a hearing with the right to present and cross-examine witnesses, it could
not show inadequacy of its right of confrontation, and hence it could not show, in this context,
that its rights were prejudiced by the lack of subpoena power and discovery. Id. at 212-13.
121. SeeK. DAVIS, supra note 30, § 8.15 (citing cases on both sides of the proposition that
discovery is a requisite element of fairness. The need for compulsory mechanisms would seem
to vary with each individual informal process).
122. The most significant detriments to compulsory process are harassment and delay.
Friendly, supra note 12, at 1282-83.
123. FED. R. Civ. P. 34. The elimination of a "good cause" requirement was a major change
of the 1970 revision of the Federal Rules. RULES ADVISORY COMM. 487.
124. APA § 6(d), 5 U.S.C. § 555(d) (1970). See Tomlinson 128-29. Relevancy may also
become an issue if an agency subpoena is resisted. Although the courts apply a very liberal
notion of relevance, numerous cases have held that the agency subpoena must be relevant to an
investigation. See, e.g., J.H. Rutter Rex Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 473 F.2d 223, 234 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 822 (1973) (one requesting subpoena must "state with sufficient
particularity what value, if any, the files would have to it"); General Eng'r, Inc. v. NLRB, 341
F.2d 367, 376 (9th Cir. 1965) (one requesting a subpoena may be required to show relevance and
reasonable scope).
The ABA has proposed that administrative subpoenas be issued on request without a
showing of relevance. The 12 ABA Recommendations for Improved Procedures for Federal
Agencies, supra note 116, at 408.
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adjudication, 125 rulemaking does not always include a clearly recognizable
presiding officer who has control over the proceeding. Consequently,
rulemaking agencies should delegate to an official the authority to issue
subpoenas 126 under the same sort of restrictive guidelines which would
accompany delegation to a presiding officer. 127 Agencies which use informal action, including informal rulemaking, to conduct business should
designate an official to handle all compulsory process requested in connection with all informal proceedings and not spread this function among the
various employees who are in charge of informal proceedings. Recognizing
the special problems of informal. action, this official should have discretion
to limit the availability of compulsory process even beyond the agency
delegation guidelines whenever the benefits derived from a specific request
would not outweigh the potential for oppression, harassment or delay.
In summary, where the procedure is relatively formalized as in hybrid
rulemaking, a presiding officer can control subpoena authority in much the
same way as in an adjudicative hearing but under the restrictions prescribed
by the delegation guidelines. For the great bulk of rulemaking, the absence
of a clearly defined presiding employee will make the necessary control
more difficult, and hence, the agency should appoint a special discovery
official to handle all such requests under one set of guidelines. Whichever
type of employee is utilized, the official should have discretion to limit
compulsory process further than the restrictive guidelines but within certain
general bounds.
(b) Subpoena ad testificandum. Compelling the attendance of witnesses in informal rulemaking raises substantial conceptual problems. While
participants are offered or guaranteed the right to make an oral presentation
with increasing frequency, there is no movement to compel persons to
participate in rulemaking. The target of a rule has the right of confrontation
only to the extent needed to rebut written or oral comments which have been
voluntarily submitted. Although cross-examination is an important device in
hybrid procedure, if a participant does not voluntarily appear to give oral
testimony, he may avoid cross-examination.
125. In formal adjudication, there will be an administrative law judge who will automatically
exercise the agency's subpoena authority. See Tomlinson 141.
126. Authority to issue subpoenas may be sub-delegated to agency employees. EEOC v.
Exchange Security Bank, 529 F.2d 1214 (5th Cir. 1976); FTC v. Gibson, 460 F.2d 605 (5th Cir.
1972); United States v. Marshall Durbin & Co., 363 F.2d I, 6-7 (5th Cir. 1966). The sub·
delegation is usually confined by an investigative order, and the subpoenas issued by the lower
level official must be within the scope of that order. SEC v. First Security Bank, 447 F.2d 166,
169 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Nemelka v. SEC, 404 U.S. 1038 (1971) (upholding the
issue of a subpoena on the basis of a very broad investigative order).
127. SeeK. DAVIS supra note 30, § 9.05-1 (1976) (sub-delegation should include administrative standards); Hamilton 1175.
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As a general proposition, it does not seem consistent with the concept
of rulemaking to require persons to appear in order to be cross-examined.
Nonetheless, there is a limited place in informal rulemaking for use of the
subpoena ad testificandum. In order to assemble a complete record, it may
be necessary in special cases to require such subpoenas for experts, especially where they may be the only source of certain relevant information.
Interrogatories may ferret out most of this information, 128 but appearance of
an expert may be required by fairness considerations. For example, fairness
may compel the appearance of an expert who has been consulted by the
agency when there is no other way to refute his findings or opinions.
Subpoenas should also be available to compel testimony of persons other
than experts who may have special knowledge of relevant facts, or persons
such as employees, competitors, or those with other business relationships,
who may be reluctant to come forward for fear of retaliation unless afforded
the trappings of compulsion. Subpoena ad testificandum in rulemaking
should nonetheless be reserved for very special circumstances.
(c) Return of subpoena. The Administrative Conference study expressed particular concern for the practice of many agencies in providing for
return of subpoena at the hearing, 129 thereby avoiding prehearing discovery.
In a sense, this is not a problem in rulemaking because the record remains
open for an extended period and does not close at the end of any oral
proceeding. If, because of the absence of prehearing discovery, the participant cannot present his full position, the further presentation can always be
added to the record. This process, however, is equivalent to the much
criticized "hearing by interval. " 130 The goal in rulemaking, therefore,
should be the return of subpoenas in time to permit rebuttal.

Production of Documents and Tangible Things
A participant in rulemaking may obtain documents either through
discovery, which can operate on either the agency or a private person, or
through a Freedom of Information Act request, which can operate only on
the agency but which may result in access to private documents. A participant should first attempt to obtain access to documents through a traditional
subpoena duces tecum, because this process will be directly related to the
specific proceedings. Where a traditional subpoena duces tecum is not
available, however, or where the desired documents are outside the scope of
the agency's discovery provisions, an effective participant must understand
128. The problem may be mitigated by some compulsion to answer written interrogatories.

See FED. R. C1v. P. 37(d).
129. See Tomlinson 127.
130. See Rowe, The Role of Discovery in Federal Trade Commission Proceedings, 21 AD. L.
REv. 439 (1968-69); see also Tomlinson 128.
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and use the Freedom of Information Act. Familiarity with the potential of
that Act will greatly increase the fund of information available for use in
rulemaking.
(a) Agency process for discovery of documentary material. In
rulemaking, there is often no testimonial procedure or only an abbreviated
testimonial phase. A participant must therefore have an adequate means of
obtaining documentary evidence in order to prepare for and to support an
effective written presentation or oral argument. To the extent that such
access to documentary evidence is limited, therefore, the argument for
testimonial devices becomes much stronger. An agency's reticence to provide adequate discovery of relevant documents may work against its efforts
to avoid the imposition of formal testimonial procedures. In addition, as
discussed above, notions of fairness and the concept of equality of opportunity articulated in section 6(d) 131 of the APA compel the conclusion that
some process must be provided to enable private participants to obtain
materials which are necessary to represent their interests. 132
The open admissibility of documentary "evidence" creates a unique
problem. The adjudicative process contains various procedures for testing
documentary evidence before it is admitted for use in the decision-making.
In rulemaking, there is no such testing. Even in hybrid rulemaking, only
those documents directly related to oral testimony may be tested by crossexamination. Other documents, even where there are some trial procedures,
will enter the record with no screening. Since it would be contrary to the
whole notion of informal rulemaking to reject documentary evidence which
has not gone through the screening processes used in adjudication, a
rulemaking record will necessarily be full of documentary material of
indeterminate value. Yet rulemaking is primarily concerned with argument
over policy, and the only purpose served by trial procedures in rulemaking is
to permit the introduction of oral proof into the record; the procedures are
not intended to create trial-type thresholds for the admissibility of evidence.
Therefore, the agencies will inevitably have a great deal of discretion in
determining the authenticity and competence of documents, the inferences
which can be drawn from the written material presented, and the weight to
be given documents. One limitation on this discretion would be a requirement that the agency carefully explain the value placed on significant,
untested documentary evidence in its "statement of basis and purpose. " 133
Another potential control is participant questions of the competence
and value of a document. However, the ability of the participants to
131. 5 u.s.c. § 555(d) (1970).
132. See notes 119-21 supra and accompanying text.
133. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. NRC, 547 F.2d 633, 646 (D.C. Cir.
1976); Pedersen, supra note 24, at 7C).

Vol. 1977:295]

DISCOVERY IN RULEMAKING

327

challenge or bolster documentary evidence may depend on their ability to
find information relative to the subject of the document. Written interrogatories provide one method for uncovering further information, but it
would also serve this purpose if the agency assisted participants in obtaining
further documentary material. Because written submissions are so important
to informal rulemaking, the discovery of documents should be preferred
over other forms of discovery, particularly where the documents are sought
to support a response to other participants' documentary submissions.
An interesting question is whether documentary requests aimed at
non-participants should be treated differently from requests to participants,
especially dominant participants. The Administrative Conference recommendation for formal proceedings distinguishes parties from non-parties,
making access to party documents more difficult to obtain than access to
non-party documents. 134 As previously noted, the party/fion-party distinction breaks down in rulemaking. 135 Even though some persons are clearly
more interested than others, a distinction between parties and non-parties, or
interested and not-so-interested persons, serves no purpose. If any such
distinction is to be made, it should be done only to facilitate documentary
requests to participants and to restrict closely requests to non-participants.
On the whole, a subpoena duces tecum should be available to elicit
documentary material from any person, and should be issued to any potential participant who demonstrates that the subpoena will produce valuable
information. The scope of the right to subpoenas duces tecum should not be
limited according to who is asking for the information or from whom the
information would be obtained: the key issue is whether the subpoena will
be likely to produce information valuable to the rulemaking process. Indeed,
a petition demonstrating a valuable line of inquiry should lead the agency
staff to follow that line on its own. Rulemaking is, after all, investigative
and not adversarial. The agency should actively pursue any source of
information, and it should delegate to its staff authority to determine the
value of lines of inquiry suggested by an interested person. The agency's
more active role, however, should be in lieu of th~ ready availability of
subpoena duces tecum. Such subpoenas should be issued to a private
participant in rulemaking under fairly limited circumstances.
As suggested above, a special staff person should have control of such
subpoena power for all informal rulemaking. 136 This official should be
delegated discretion, under careful guidelines, to limit the availability of
134. Report of the Comm. on Compliance and Enforcement Proceedings in Support of
Recommendation No. 21, supra note 9, at 643-45. This divergent treatment is based on the need
for the presid~ng officer to exercise control pver interparty discovery and on the fact that such
discovery is likely to be quantitatively greater than that between parties and non-parties. See
Tomlinson 131-32.
135. See text accompanying notes 32-33 supra.
136. See text accompanying notes 126-27 supra.
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subpoenas duces tecum more narrowly than the statutory bounds of relevancy and reasonable scope. The agency should provide some mechanism for
reviewing any failure to issue a private subpoena and for challenging any
subpoena so issued. Because of the special utility of documentary material
in rulemaking, a subpoena duces tecum should be more readily available
than a subpoena ad testificandum and refusal should be more carefully
considered. Judicial review, however, must await the final rule, as in the
case of other nonconstitutional procedural denials. 137
Under the Administrative Conference's recommendation for adjudications, when a party applies for production of documents, the burden shifts to
the person from whom the documents are requested. In other words, the
burden of persuasion is placed on the party opposing the production of
documents. 138 The scope of informal rulemaking, however, generally dictates against free-wheeling requests for documents from private individuals.
Rather, the initial burden in rulemaking should be on the applicant to
demonstrate, in addition to relevancy and reasonable scope, the need for the
documents and the substantial benefit they will confer on the rulemaking
process. The production of documents is always a burden. Corporations are
already straining under the information demands of the government, and
even a limited request for documents will be burdensome to most private
individuals. Thus, before the government acquiesces in any increase in this
burden, an applicant should be required to overcome a threshold showing of
need and potential benefit. The requesting participant should also be required to show that the agency rulemaking staff has not or will not pursue a
source of important, relevant documentary material. This last requirement
will, of course, substantially raise the threshold because it can be presumed
that the staff will attempt to secure any useful documentary information to
which it is alerted.
(b) Discovery of agency documents. While strict limitations on the
right to obtain documents from private individuals are imperative to prevent
oppression, harassment and delay, the right to obtain information from the
rulemaking agency need not be so confined. Two possibilities exist for
tapping this source: discovery and the Freedom of Information Act.
An agency's procedures for allowing discovery of documents in its
possession should permit at least the level of access to such documents
afforded in judicial proceedings. Traditionally, discovery of agency docu137. Interlocutory appeal of an agency decision with regard to discovery is not generally
permitted. E.g., FfC v. Feldman, 532 F.2d 1092, 1096 (7th Cir. 1976); Genuine Parts Co. v.
FfC, 445 F.2d 1382, 1394 (5th Cir. 1971); Maremont Corp. v. FfC, 431 F.2d 124, 127-28 (7th
Cir. 1970); cf. First Nat'l City Bank v. FfC, 38 Ao. L.2o 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (pre-enforcement
review of subpoena denied).
138. Tomlinson 121.
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ments under the Federal Rules 139 has been limited by only two privileges:
the "state secret" privilege140 and the official documents privilege. 141The
state secret privilege is limited to military or diplomatic secrets. 142 Ordinarily, rulemaking will not involve national secrets; 143 hence allowing the
agencies broad discretion to deny access to such documents will rarely result
in detrimental withholding. It is also probable that agencies with sensitive
documents will not release them to other agencies. As a result, non-military
and non-diplomatic agencies whose rules may affect these areas will not
possess truly "secret" information in most cases.
Thus, only the official document privilege will be likely to impose
substantial limitations on discovery of agency documents in rulemaking.
Where the privilege is provided for by statute, 144 no serious definitional
problems will be presented. On the other hand, the scope of the judge-made
privilege is not clear and must be determined on a case-by-case basis. 145 The
theory behind the case-by-case determination is one of balancing. Courts
have differed, however, on which interest should be balanced. 146
Generally, the courts have balanced the discoverant's need for the
information against the agency's need to protect the document. An agency
conducting an administrative proceeding would be justified in making a
similar determination before disclosing any of its own documents which
might be privileged. Striking this balance, or delegating to an employee the
authority to strike this balance, will be preferable to a stonewall refusal to
release a certain official document. However, the "public interest" should
also be considered in the formula, 147 and in rulemaking the public interest is
strongly in favor of disclosure of any government documents which a
139. FED. R. CIV. P. 26, 34.
140. See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 6-9 (1953); Zagel, The State Secrets
Privilege, 50 MINN. L. REv. 875 (1966). See also United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 706,
710-11 (1974).
141. See generally 4 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE~~ 26.61[1]-[6.1], [7] (2d ed. 1975); 2 J.
WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 60, ~~ 509[05]-[10]; Berger, How the Privilege for
Governmental Information Met Its Watergate, 25 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 747 (1975); Bishop,
The Executive's Right of Privacy: An Unresolved Constitutional Question, 66 YALE L.J. 477
(1962).
142. 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 60, ~~ 509[02]-[04].
143. Many agencies make rules affecting foreign affairs or national defense and rulemaking
directly involving these subjects may be exempt from notice and comment procedures. APA §4
(a), 5 U.S.C. § 553(a) (1970). See Bonfield, Military and Foreign Affairs Function Rule-Making
Under the APA, 71 MICH. L. REV. 222 (1972).
144. See Comment, Discovery of Government Documents and the Official Information
Privilege, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 142, 149-56 (1976).
145. See Tomlinson 136.
146. See Comment, supra note 144, at 143-45.
147. See id. at 143. See also FED. R. Evm. 509(a)(2) ("Official information ..• the
disclosure of which is contrary to the public interest . . . ").
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participant in the proceeding feels may lead to a more complete record.
Agencies should, therefore, be hesitant to withhold any information from a
rulemaking participant on the grounds of the official information privilege.
(c) The Freedom of Information Act as a discovery tool. The enactment of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) reflected Congress' determination that widespread disclosure of government information is in the
public interest. 148 Indeed, if a rulemaking participant desires information
contained in a government file, the FOIA may be the best available discovery tooi.l 49 Access to agency documents through the Act need not be in
conjunction with a particular proceeding, therefore an attempt to secure
documents may begin immediately after an interested person receives any
hint that a rulemaking is being considered. The time limits under the new
amendments to the FOIA should permit prompt access to agency files. 150
The FOIA provides de facto prehearing discovery since the agency
cannot limit access to information in its files to return at hearing. The
judicial opinions enforcing the Act evidence a much greater inclination to
open up the files of agencies than do judicial interpretations of the ordinary
discovery provisions. On the other hand, while the use of the FOIA for
discovery purposes has not been proscribed, some courts have taken a dim
view of efforts to use the Act as a substitute for Federal Rule 26. 151
Nonetheless, in agency proceedings where discovery is limited, as in most
rulemaking, the FOIA may fill an important void. 152
148. See S. Doc. No. 93-82, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-3 (1974).
149. The FOIA does not require creation of material il) government files. A request which
requires compiling information may be refused, and hence the Act will not serve the same
function as interrogatories or the like.
150. See 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(6)" (Supp. 1976) (requiring agency response within 10
days to any person requesting information under the Act). But cf. Open American v. Watergate
Special Prosecution Force, 547 F.2d 605 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (permitting FBI to exceed time limits
where compliance efforts were shown to have been made with "due diligence" and in "good
faith").
151. See, e.g., Renegotiation Bd. v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U.S. 1, 24 (1974);
National Cable Television Ass'n v. FCC, 479 F.2d 183, 193 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Lincoln National
Bank v. Lampe, 45 U.S.L.W. 2195 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 13, 1976) Verrazzano Trading Corp. v.
United States, 349 F. Supp. 1401, 1403 (Cust. Ct. 1972). But seeK. DAVIS, supra note 30, at 63
(contending that FOIA was intended to benefit party in an agency proceeding as well as to
compel disclosure to the electorate); Comment, Taxpayers Discovery in Civil Federal Tax
Controversies, 51 NEB. L. REV. 290, 294 (1971).
The FfC attempted to separate the FOIA from discovery by channeling discovery through
administrative Jaw judges (in accordance with traditional procedures) and FOIA requests
through agency-wide FOIA processes. See J.J. Newberry Co., 30 Ao. L.2o 816 (FfC 1972);
Hearst Corp., 30 Ao. L.2o 92 (FfC 1971). A similar approach is suggested in Hamilton at 1175.
152. See Bannercraft Clothing Co. v. Renegotiation Bd., 466 F.2d 345, 352 (D.C. Cir. 1972),
rev'd, 415 U.S. I (1974) (staying an agency proceeding until information was released under the
FOIA, apparently because the renegotiation process did not include the availability of
discovery).
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It is important to emphasize that the FOIA does not permit the agency
to distinguish between requesting parties; it requires disclosure to "any
person. " 153 One implication of this terminology is that access is available
without any demonstration of need. Thus, from an interested person's point
of view, the Act is the perfect discovery device: the agency cannot limit
access to information by requiring a showing of need, reasonable scope or
relevancy to a proceeding. 154 Secondly, the Act's language implies that any
number of interested persons may seek such unlimited "discovery." Although the broad scope of the Act enhances its utility from a private
interest's point of view, its breadth is a mixed blessing in terms of the
general public interest. While Congress clearly found that the public was
best served by burdening the public treasury with the considerable expense
of providing broad disclosure of information and ordained that disclosure
take precedence over the agencies' ability to perform their primary functions, a paramount public interest still dictates that information requests not
be permitted to interfere with or interrupt the rulemaking process. The FOIA
may arm those who are adversely affected by a proposed regulation with a
technique for frustrating the rulemaking effort by preventing a rulemaking
agency from closing the record or issuing a rule pending disclosure of great
quantities of information no matter how important or relevant.
In situations not involving rulemaking, there has been substantial
controversy· over whether courts can stay agency proceedings until final
determination with respect to an FOIA request. Although the Supreme Court
refused to stay proceedings in the only context in which this question has
been presented to it, it refused to eliminate the possibility that it might do so
in other settings. 155 Despite the statutory effort to speed compliance by the
imposition of strict time limits within which an agency must act on a
request, 156 any documents which the agency wishes to protect and which are
arguably exempt from disclosure may be released only after a court proceeding. An FOIA case may take considerable time and thus the danger remains
of a de facto denial of access to information necessary for meaningful
participation in rulemaking. But rulemaking involves a broad public interest, and a court should be reluctant to bridle that interest for the purpose of a
153. 5 U.S.C. § 551(a)(3) (1970).
154. The Act is probably an overreaction to the agencies' use of "good cause" and similar
language in the old public information provision of the APA to shut out virtually all public
scrutiny. See S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965); Davis, The Information Act: A
Preliminary Analysis, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 761, 765-66 (1967) (criticizing broad access without
requiring a reason).
155. Renegotiation Bd. v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U.S. 1, 17-20 (1974); accord,
Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc. v. FTC, 517 F.2d 1013 (7th Cir. 1975); General Cigar Co. v.
Nash, 36 Ao. L.2o '1073 (D.D.C. 1975); Title Guarantee Co. v. NLRB, 37 Ao. L.2o 685
(S.D.N.Y. 1975).
156. See note 150 supra and accompanying text.
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single Information Act request. This is especially true since an interested
person who receives new information can always petition for modification
of a final rule under section 4(d) of the APA. 157 The present posture of the
courts, therefore, is probably correct: stays should be considered, but only
reluctantly granted.
Nine exemptions limit access to information under the FOIA and
specifically define the information which the agency may withhold. 158 Thus
the structure of the Act is to grant total access and then withdraw, through
the exemptions, specific categories of documents. The agencies may withhold information only by overcoming the presumption in favor of disclosure
through a demonstration that one of the exemptions applies. Two exemptions in particular serve to protect the kind of government information
frequently desired by rulemaking participants: exemption 5, the interagency
and intra-agency information exemption, and exemption 7, the exemption
for investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes. A brief
discussion of these two exemptions in the rulemaking context may be
helpful.
The internal documents exemption is the one most closely related to
traditional discovery doctrines. 159 Interpretation of this exemption has been
based on the notion that discovery of the mental processes of agency
personnel should not be permitted. This interpretation is supported by the
157. 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) {1970).
158. 5 U.S.C. f552(b) (1970), as amended by Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561 (1974),
provides that the Act does not require disclosure of matters that are:
(I) (A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be
kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact
properly classified pursuant to such Executive order;
(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency;
(3) specifically exempted from <fisclosure by statute;
(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person
and privileged or confidential;
(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency;
(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would
constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
(7) investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the
extent that the production of such records would {A) interfere with enforcement
proceedings, (B) deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication,
(C) constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, {D) disclose the identity
of a confidential source and, in the case of a record compiled by a criminal law
enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency
conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, confidential information furnished only by the confidential source, (E) disclose investigative techniques
and procedures, or (F) endanger the life or physical safety of law enforcement
personnel;
(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared
by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or
supervision of financial institutions; or
{9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning
wells.
159. See NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 148-53 (1975); EPA v. Mink, 410
u.s. 73, 85-86 (1973).
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FOIA's legislative history, which clearly indicates that the exemption was
intended to prevent the agencies from operating in a "fishbowl. " 160 This
exemption protects the opinion portions of agency documents, 161 and hence,
the overall effect is to render the FOIA useless as a means of uncovering the
reasons behind a proposed rule. 162
The other important exemption, the investigatory files exemption, may
not apply to rulemaking files. As amended in 1974, this exemption applies
only to "investigative records compiled for law enforcement purposes. " 163
Clearly, rulemaking has law enforcement goals and, as such, any investigation conducted for the purpose of promulgating a rule would appear to be
within the language of the exemption. Records compiled for rulemaking
may be considered law enforcement because the law-defining process of
rulemaking is essentially prophylactic; 164 that is, its function is to define the
law so as to prevent violations. 165 Nevertheless, the Attorney General
specifically stated that "[r]ecords generated for such purposes as determining the need for new regulations . . . '' are not compiled for law enforcement purposes. 166 This conclusion is supported by a statement made by the
sponsor of the 1974 amendment to this exemption, Senator Hart, who
suggested that the exemption was intended to cover only judicial-type law
enforcement proceedings which focused on specific violations. 167 Further
support for limiting the exemption to proceedings involving actual violations is found in the few FOIA cases which have tried to define the extent of
the term "law enforcement. " 168
160. S. REP. No. 813, supra note 154, at 9.
161. See EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 85-89 (1973).
162. However, opinion-type documents which are "secret law" must be disclosed. For
example, an interpretation of a regulation or an internal directive modifying a regulation would
have to be released. See Davis, supra note 148, at 797. Also, the thinking of the agency should
be disclosed in the notice of proposed rule making. See text accompanying note 203-05 infra.
163. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (Supp. IV 1974). In its original form, the exemption applied to
"investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes except to the extent available by
law to a party other than an agency." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1970).
164. See National Petroleum Ref. Ass'n v. FfC, 482 F.2d 672, 698 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974).
165. Support for this notion is found in the Attorney General's memo on the 1974 amendments to the FOIA in which it is suggested that the scope of "'[l]aw enforcement' includes not
merely the detection and punishment of law violation, but also its prevention." ATIORNEY
GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM, supra note 78, at 6.
166. Id. See Note, Developments Under the Freedom of Information Act-1974, 1975 DUKE
L.J. 416, 450-51.
167. Freedom of Information Act and Amendments of 1974 Sourcebook: Legislative History,
Texts, and Other Documents, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., at 333 (Joint Comm. Print 1975) (the
exemption would apply to "a concrete prospective law enforcement proceeding").
168. "[W]here the inquiry departs from the routine and focuses with special intensity upon a
particular party, an investigation is under way." Center for National Policy Review v. Weinberger, 502 F.2d 370, 373 (D.C. Cir. 1974); accord, Rural Housing Alliance v. USDA, 498 F.2d
73, 81 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (distinguishing between files relating to "surveillance or oversight" and
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The 1974 amendment of the exemption which changed "files" to
''records'' also suggests an intention to protect only specific law enforcement materials. 169 To understand the full impact of what appears to be a
mere semantic amendment, one must recognize the perceived trend in the
development of the law just prior to 1974. In a major shift in perspective,
the District of Columbia Circuit began deciding cases involving the exemption in such a way as to imply a blanket exemption for all files compiled in
law enforcement proceedings. 170 The drafters of the 1974 amendment
thought that the term "records" would focus the exemption more narrowly
on only the investigative portions of agency files and not on entire files
compiled in furtherance of investigations. It is difficult to conceive of any
portion of a rulemaking file which would take on the aspects of specific law
enforcement material. Again, the exemption makes sense only in terms of
the specific focus of an investigation on an individual; an investigative
"record" implies information related to a particularized quasi-judicial inquiry, not a quasi-legislative record. All of the above is reasonable with
respect to subsection (A) of exemption (7), but the other subsections, (B-F),
have their own justifications which raise questions as to their applicability in
rulemaking. For example, there may be good reason why an informer's
identity should be protected, even in rulemaking. Perhaps the specific
subsections of the exemption, other than subsection (A), should be treated
as expressing specific purposes which have independent significance in
addition to the general prevention of interference with agency law enforcement and, hence, should be applied where these specific purposes can be
demonstrated. Such an approach conflicts with the clear language of the
Act, however, for the phrase "investigative records compiled for law
enforcement purposes'' applies to all the parts of the exemption. Indeed, the
specific provisions of the exemption appear to be intended to limit further
"investigations which focus directly on specifically alleged illegal acts, illegal acts of particular
identified officials, acts which could, if proved, result in civil or criminal sanctions"). Although
these two cases were decided prior to the effective date of the amendment, the above interpretations seem consistent with the thrust of the 1974 changes and hence continue in force with
respect to this issue).
169. ATIORNEY GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM, supra note 78, at 5-6.
170. See, e.g., Rural Housing Alliance v. USDA, 498 F.2d 73 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Ditlaw v.
Brinegar, 494 F.2d 1073 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 974 (1974); Aspin v. Laird, 491 F.2d
24 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
The trend began with Weisberg v. Department of Justice, 489 F.2d 1195 (D.C. Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 993 (1974), a case that was distinguishable because it involved a criminal
i11vestigatory file. Criminal files should be treated separately and given far more protection than
civil investigatory files in order to prevent disruption of criminal law enforcement and protect
those under criminal investigation. It is possible that the District of Columbia Circuit, with its
reputation for strict interpretation of the FOIA exemptions, merely appeared to apply this
exemption more broadly because the agencies were presenting specific factual situations which
justified a broad reading of the exemption.
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the scope of the introductory phrase and not to provide individual excuses
for withholding information. On balance, weighing the pro-disclosure bias
of the Act, it seems more consistent with the original congressional intent,
as well as the congressional intent in amending the Act, to consider
rulemaking files outside the exemption altogether.
(d) Government files as a source of private information. In discussing the use of discovery techniques and the FOIA to gain access to agency
files, it is important to note that these files may also be a prime source of
private information. 171 An astute participant in a rulemaking proceeding
should therefore consider the possibility of seeking access to government
files before deciding that a desired private document is unavailable.
The Administrative Conference recommended that non-privileged private information in the hands of the government be discoverable by parties
to an agency adjudication, regardless of whether the information was transmitted to the agency in confidence. 172 This proposal would appear to have
equal validity in rulemaking.
The FOIA may also offer access to the fund of private information in
government files. Two major exemptions, the fourth and the sixth, 173 may
protect this private information, but both have been given very limited scope
by the courts. 174 In addition, it is uncertain whether an agency is obliged to
assert an available exemption. 175 Even if such action were required by law 176
171. See Gellhorn 126-29.
172. Report of the Comm. on Compliance and Enforcement Proceedings in Support of
Recommendation No. 21, supra note 9, at 654-55. The conference seemed concerned only with
the effect public disclosure might have on the agency. The report evidences no concern for
individual privacy as such. Id. at 655-56 (referring to the potential applicability of FOIA
exemption (4), protecting commercial or financial information, rather than exemption (6),
personal privacy).
173. The text of the exemptions is quoted in note 158 supra.
174. Judicial construction of these exemptions conforms with the apparent lack of respect
the drafters of the FOIA had for the right of privacy. The sole exemption which covers
individual privacy is triggered only when the invasion is "clearly unwarranted"; disclosure
which constitutes an arguably justifiable invasion of privacy is compelled by the Act. See
Davis, supra note 154, at 783; Miiier, Personal Privacy in the Computer Age: The Challenge of a
New Technology in an Information-Oriented Society, 67 MICH. L. REV. 1089, 1194 (1969). In
applying this exemption, the courts have balanced the right to privacy against the need for
disclosure, giving greater weight to the latter consideration. See Department of the Air Force v.
Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 378-82 (1976); Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 674-76 (D.C. Cir. 1971). It
would seem that the right to privacy demands better treatment. Indeed, in the context of
judicial discovery, federal courts have recognized that interests in privacy may call for a
measure of extra protection. See RULES ADVISORY COMM. 497.
175. For a discussion of this question, see Note, Protection from Government DisclosureThe Reverse-FOIA Suit, 1976 DuKE L. J. 330. Several private parties who have supplied
information to the government have sought to prevent disclosure of the information in response
to FOIA requests. Id. at 331-32.
It would appear to be a misuse of public funds for the government to defend these "reverse
FOIA" cases. The plaintiff has the burden of making a prima facie case, and if a party can carry
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or if a common law privilege were created for private documents, 177 the
protection afforded would be of limited value since the affected private
person would often not receive notice that his privacy had been jeopardized
by a request or intention to release. 178 Clearly, the absence of adequate
protection for those who submit private information to the government is the
one area where lack of diligence by the drafters of the FOIA has done the
most damage. Nonetheless, for one seeking information, it is a ready avenue
and should not be ignored in preparing for rulemaking. 179
this burden, there is no justification for the government's wasting public funds in an attempt to
rebut an individual's right to protect information which is arguably confidential.
176. There has been some suggestion that the fourth exemption, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4)
(1970), prohibits disclosure of confidential private information. See Westinghouse Elec. v.
Schlesinger, 392 F. Supp. 1246 (E.D. Va. 1974); see also GTE Sylvania v. Consumer Prod.
Safety Comm'n, 404 F. Supp. 352 (D. Del. 1975); Burroughs Corp. v. Schlesinger, 403 F. Supp.
633 (E.D. Va. 1975). But the burden is on the one seeking to prevent disclosure. Chrysler Corp.
v. Schlesinger, 412 F. Supp. 171 (D. Del. 1976); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. GSA, 402 F. Supp.
378 (D.D.C. 1975); Hughes Aircraft v. Schlesinger, 384 F. Supp. 292 (C.D. Cal. 1975). The state
of confusion is demonstrated by two recent Fifth Circuit cases. The first, Continental Oil v.
FPC, 519 F.2d 31 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied sub. nom Superior Oil v. FPC, 96 S. Ct. 2168
(1976), appears to have held that exemption (4) is mandatory. The second, Pennzoil Co. v. FPC,
534 F.2d 627 (5th Cir. 1976), concluded that the FOIA did not prevent disclosure. Cf. LaMorte
v. Mansfield, 438 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1971) (the exemption belongs to the agency, not to private
individuals).
177. For example, such a privilege could be developed through judicial review of agency
decisions to release private information in order to determine whether the action was an abuse
of discretion. See Note, supra note 175, at 344-47.
Whether a private right of action can be implied under 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1970) (making
disclosure of trade secrets and other confidential information by a government employee a
criminal offense) is a matter of some dispute. For example, in Charles River Park "A," Inc. v.
HUD, 519 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1975), the court originally held that it could imply such a right,
but subsequently changed its mind.
178. Although one court has refused to imply a right to notice prior to disclosure of private
information in the hands of an agency, Pharmaceutical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Weinberger, 401 F. Supp •.
444, 448 (D.D.C. 1975), a few agencies have provided for a limited right to notice by regulation.
See 32 C.F.R. § 1285.7(b)(7) (1976) (Defense Supply Agency required to give notice whenever
"there is reason to believe that the source of the information . . . may object to release and
may have an enforceable right to prevent release . . . . "); 21 C.F.R. §§4.45·46 (FDA required
to give prior notice where confidentiality is close or "uncertain"). These notice procedures
have been found to conform to due process requirements. See Chrysler Corp. v. Schlesinger,
412 F. Supp. 171, 178 (D. Del. 1976) (Defense Supply Agency); Pharmaceutical Mfrs. Ass'n v.
Weinberger, 411 F. Supp. 576, 578 (D.D.C. 1976) (FDA).
One means of providing some protection for private persons would be to require rulemaking participants to attempt to obtain the information from the private person himself prior to
seeking access to the agency files. See, e.g., FTC Procedures and Rules of Practice, 16 C.F.R. §
3.36(b) (1977). Such an approach was rejected by the Administrative Conference in developing
its recommendations for agency adjudication. Tomlinson 139.
179. Some agencies, such as the FTC, require a showing that the private information was
not available through voluntary means. Such requirements have been criticized. Bennett,
Post-Complaint Discovery in Administrative Proceedings: The FTC As a Case Study, 1975
DUKE L. J. 329.
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(e) Discovery or FOIA requests for Exhibits. It should be possible for
interested persons to obtain exhibits and other "tangible things" to the same
extent as documents. 180 Many agency discovery statutes authorize subpoenas only for "documentary evidence, " 181 but the realities are that
discovery has been made applicable, as recommended by the Administrative
Conference, to "documents and tangible things." 182
An interesting question is whether the FOIA provides access to exhibits
and tangible things. The Act refers to "records," 183 and one early case held
that this did not include exhibits. 184 However, there is no practical reason to
distinguish documents from other tangible things; therefore, tangible things
should be made available to the same extent as documents despite the
semantic argument that they are not "records." 185 .

Protective Orders and Other Protections for Private Information
Concomitant with the availability of discovery in rulemaking is the
need to protect sensitive private and government information through protective orders, assurances of confidentiality, devices in the nature of in
camera inspection, and other measures. 186 It is clear that, where rulemaking
procedure provides for discovery, protective devices should be available. 187
The context of rulemaking does not affect the validity of this general
proposition; however, the amorphous character of informal rulemaking does
create some difficulties in providing protective devices. One problem is
determining who should have authority to grant protective orders. In adjudication, the administrative law judge can perform this function, 188 but,
180. Tomlinson 126.
181. See, e.g., FrC Act§ 9, 15 U.S.C. § 49 (1970).
182. See Tomlinson 126.
183. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1970).
184. Nichols v. United States, 325 F. Supp. 130, 135-37 (D. Kan. 1971), aff'd on other
grounds, 460 F.2d 671 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 966 (1972) (denying access to exhibits
relating to President Kennedy's assassination). See Note, supra note 23, at 904 n.55.
185. In Stokes v. Brennan, 476 F.2d 699 (5th Cir. 1973), the court interpreted literally the
terms "memorandums or letters" -in FOIA exemption (5). It found that the exemption did not
include films, and therefore ordered that internal government films be disclosed. Id. at 704. See
Note, Developments Under the Freedom of Information Act-1975, 1976 DUKE L.J. 366, 391.
Consquently, exhibits and tangible things may ·be more available since they could never be
subject to the internal document exemption under the Stokes rationale.
186. Judge Weinstein lists six measures which should be considered. 2 J.WEINSTEIN & M.
BERGER, supra note 60, 11 508(3). The Administrative Conference lists various protections.
Recommendation No. 21: Discovery in Agency-Adjudication, supra note 9, at 42.
187. See FrC v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 304 F. Supp. 1254, 1260-61 (D.D.C.
1969); Tomlinson 140-41. Cf. FrC v. Crowther, 430 F.2d 510 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (questioning the
agency's refusal to provide same protection for business information given in similar previous
case).
188. See Gellhorn 182. The presiding officer can also perform· this function in formal
rulemaking. See Hamilton 1175.
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generally speaking, there is no independent presiding officer in rulemaking.
The agency could delegate authority to the discovery official suggested
above; 189 however, the power to create non-public files in rulemaking
should be closely circumscribed. 190 If the agency delegates this authority to
a presiding officer or a special discovery officer, it must do so with very
restrictive standards. 191 Rulemaking differs from adjudication in that public
participation is essential to its functioning. Anything which closes the
process or excludes the public detracts from its efficacy. Thus, only in the
most extreme case should information be shielded from the public. Caution
might, in fact, require that the power to apply protective devices should
remain in the agency head. Whether the agency head retains the authority or
delegates it, great care should be taken to limit the use of protective devices
in rulemaking.
Another major problem is the effect of agency protective orders on
information sought under the Freedom of Information Act. The general rule
developed by the courts is that assurances of confidentiality-informal protective orders-do not necessarily protect documents submitted to the agency even when submitted in reliance on the assurance. 192 The only effect of
such orders, it appears, is to commit the agency to claim an exemption for
the document and to attempt to protect the documents from judicial
release. 193

Roles of the Presiding Officer and the Agency Staff in Discovery
(a) The presiding officer. The Administrative Conference recommendation for agency adjudication relies throughout on a strong presiding
officer, and it would delegate to him broad discovery authority, free from
interlocutory appeal except by certification. 194 The difficulty with applying
this recommendation to rulemaking is, once again, the amorphorous nature
of the rulemaking procedure, and particularly the uncertain functions of the
presiding officer.
There has been little study of the role of a presiding officer in rulemaking. If the proceeding is totally written, there might be no presiding officer,
189. See text accompanying notes 126-27, supra.
190. Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, No. 75-1280 at 97 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 25, 1977) (requiring
that information be disclosed for comment "at some time").
191. See Gellhorn, supra note 61, at 422-23 (arguing that the agency should set standards for
presiding officers' decisions regarding sensitive private information).
192. See Petkas v. Staats, 501 F.2d 887, 889-90 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Robles v. EPA, 484 F.2d
843, 846 (4th Cir. 1973). Assurances of confidentiality will protect personal documents from
disclosure under the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 552a(k)(2), (5), (7) (1970), but it has been
suggested that they be sparingly granted. Privacy Act Implementation: Guidelines and Responsibilities, 40 Fed. Reg. 28,948, 28,973 (1975).
193. See note 175 supra and accompanying text.
194. Recommendation No. 21: Discovery in Agency Adjudication, supra note 9, at 242.
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or only a designated agency employee with whom comment should be filed.
Where there is only an oral argument-style hearing, the presiding officer
may be part of a special staff employed to hear rulemaking proceedings, or
simply any designated member of the agency investigative staff. The major
hybrid rulemaking cases 195 clearly envision a somewhat judge-like presiding
officer. With respect to their ability to control the proceeding, these officers
function like a judge. In a hybrid proceeding, such control is exceedingly
important to integration of the testimonial devices with the informal process.
In informal rulemaking, however, the judicial model is inappropriate.
The presiding officer must remain a functioning party in the information
gathering process. Rulemaking is essentially an investigative process which
seeks facts and opinions related to questions of policy. A presiding officer in
rulemaking must cooperate with the investigative staff to insure that the
rulemaking record contains as much useful information as possible. In order
to promote the maximum utilization of the available expertise on the subject, the presiding officer should work closely with the staff in formulating
the proposed rule and any recommendation to the ultimate decision-maker.
Thus, the notion of separation of function is inconsistent with the concept of
rulemaking and with the most effective use of the process. 196 In sum, the
presiding officer should not sit back passively but· should aggressively
attempt to develop the record through an informed handling of the proceeding. 197 Where the presiding officer is committed to developing a complete
record, formal discovery may be less important because he may be relied
upon to explore, or to direct the staff to explore, avenues of information
suggested by an interested person.
Where a presiding officer for rulemaking is established by the agency
procedure, the Administrative Conference recommendation should be incorporated. The near absolute control proposed by the Conference is a practical
necessity; indeed, the breadth of rulemaking supports even more control
over discovery by the presiding officer than in adjudication. Interlocutory
195. See, e.g., International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 630-31 (D.C. Cir.
1973).
196. See Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Keindienst, 478 F.2d 1, 13 (3d Cir. 1973); see also
Scalia & Goodman, Procedural Aspects of the Consumer-Product Safety Act, 20 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 899, 922 (1973). On the other hand, two views of the record, that of the presiding officer
and that of the investigative staff would be valuable to the ultimate decision-maker and to a
reviewing court. Intramural bias could be checked by opening these two recommendations to
public criticism before submission to the agency head for decision.
197. The Anglo-American concept of a passive judge has been criticized even in the
traditional judicial setting. See Frankel, TheSearchforTruth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L.
REV. 1031 (1975). Clearly the presiding officer in rulemaking should be knowledgeable and well
prepared, and he should bear the greatest responsibility for a complete record.
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appeal should be prohibited and certification should be discouraged. Certainly stays should not be issued pending interlocutory appeals. 198
Where there is no presiding officer who can readily control discovery,
some other method must be found, for any means of providing discovery
still requires substantial control over its use. A member of the agency's
investigative staff might be empowered to make unreviewable decisions as
to private discovery. As suggested above, 199 perhaps each agency which
makes substantial use of informal procedures should designate a permanent
discovery officer who will handle all discovery requests made in conjunction with any informal proceeding. One advantage of this special office
would be its independence from the rulemaking staff. This independence
would enable the officer to make a disinterested determination of the likely
value of a proposed avenue of inquiry. Furthermore, under this system,
discovery might be available before the actual rulemaking process is underway, and would not have to await the appointment of a presiding official.
This benefit would be of particular significance in informal rulemaking,
where it is often difficult to tell exactly when the rulemaking begins. Of
course, where there is no actual proposed rule, the burden of demonstrating
the need for discovery will be severe. Yet there may frequently be situations
when a rule is proposed well before the determination is made to have an
oral proceeding or to appoint a presiding officer of some sort. Similarly,
where there will be no oral proceeding or presiding officer, this permanent
discovery officer may be the only mechanism aside from direct request to
the agency by which discovery can be made available.
(b) The agency staff. The agency staff should not be seen as advocates but as investigators actively developing a record without regard to the
implications of the information uncovered. 200 A major problem arises when
the agency staff itself feels compelled to "prove the rule." It is, of course,
human nature for the development staff to become advocates of the initial
rule. 201 However, staff members should be encouraged to avoid this selfimage. Discovery should serve to check this potential advocacy and to
198. Harm from the failure to provide timely discovery is less likely to result in rulemaking
because there is no absolute time by which information must enter the record. Information of
any significance can always be accepted until the final process of molding the rule has begun.
Indeed, even after the rule is issued, important information may be submitted to the agency
with a petition for amendment or repeal. APA § 4(d), 5 U.S.C. § 553(e).
199. See text accompanying notes 126-27 supra.
200. See Gellhorn 177 (FfC should disclose all reports prepared by experts); Verkuil, supra
note 112, at 224 (agencies should not be permitted to exclude from the rulemaking record
evidence adverse to their position). See also Bonfield, Representation for the Poor In Federal
Rulemaking, 67 MICH. L. REv. 511, 524 (1969) (agency should take affirmative steps to obtain
information for any point of view which it cannot reasonably expect the interest group to
·
adequately protect).
201. See Pedersen, supra note 24, at 56.
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assure that the staff does not unconsciously avoid finding some information.
The need for discovery and other procedural safeguards, therefore, is greatest when the staff of an agency demonstrates that it perceives itself in an
advocate's rather than an investigator's role. 202
Requiring Disclosure to Complement Discovery

While the extent of a right to discovery in informal rulemaking is
unclear, many of the devices of discovery should be provided simply
because they enhance the ~fficacy of the information gathering process and
because adequate sources of information are essential to effective participation. But the entire problem may be approached from a different angle:
information should be gathered and disclosed by the agency as a necessary
element of the notice required by the APA and the fundamental notions of
fairness underlying the rulemaking process. 203 Certainly, the concept of
adequate notice should include a requirement that the agency disclose, to the
greatest extent possible, what it intends to do, and may suggest that a
preliminary statement of basis and purpose accompany a proposed rule. 204
However, not only should the preliminary regulatory intention of the agency
be disclosed, but also the information which comes into its possession. An
important function of notice is to apprise the public of the information the
202. For a discussion of one staff's failure to attempt to develop a complete record and its
inability to avoid becoming an advocate for the rule, see Yale Note 827-29.
203. Notice is required by APA § 3(b), 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1970). See Verkuil, supra note II2,
at 235. Se~ also Verkuil, A Study oflnformalAdjudicationProcedures, 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 739,
789-90 (1976); Johnson, A New Fidelity to the Regulatory Ideal, 59 GEo. L.J. 869,880-81 (1971)
(suggesting that Federal Register notice as required by APA §3 (b), 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1970), is
ineffective to inform the public).
204. See Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, No. 75-1280 at 91-92 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 25, 1977)
(requiring agencies "to set out their thinking in notices of proposed rulemaking" so that an
agency discloses what it "thinks it knows in its capacity as a repository of expert opinion");
American Pub. Gas Ass'n v. FPC, 498 F.2d 718,722 (D. C. Cir. 1974) ("The procedure chosen
by the Commission must of course give the parties fair notice of exactly what the Commission
proposes to do • . . . ");see also Maryland v. EPA, 530 F.2d 215, 222 (4th Cir. 1975); Wagner
Elec. Corp. v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 1013, 1019-20 (3d Cir. 1972) (parties were denied right to
participate on a particular issue because the notice failed to disclose that the proposed rule
concerned the issue). But see Common Carrier Conference v. United States, 534 F.2d 981,983
(D.C. Cir. 1976) ("Even where there is a technical flaw in the notice, it can be overcome if the
actual conduct of the proceeding provides notice to the participants of what is under contemplation."); Texaco, Inc. v. FEA, 531 F.2d 1071, 1079-82 (Temp. Emerg. Ct. App. 1976), cert.
denied, 96 S Ct. 2662 (1976) (too much specificity should not be required in rulemaking notice);
Shell Oil Co. v. FPC, 520 F.2d 1061, 1076 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct 2661 (1976)
(notice was not insufficient because it did not say that the order might ~xtend to flowing gas).
The notice and comment procedure might be enhanced by a requirement that, at least in
major rulemaking efforts, the agency investigative staff publish with the notice a preliminary
"statement of basis and purpose" based on the initial findings, theories and conclusions which
went into the proposed rule. This requirement would not be as burdensome as it first would
appear, because the staff will probably have drafted some form of document to present to the
agency head or ultimate decision-maker in order to support issuance of a proposed rule.
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agency has already accumulated and upon which it is basing its proposed
rule. 205 Obviously, the notice cannot reiterate all the information supporting
a proposed rule. But the information can be placed immediately on the
public record, and the notice can explain how to obtain access to that record.
In addition, any information acquired by the agency after issuance of the
proposed rule should be promptly added to the public record.
Again, the conceptual difference between the agency staff in rulemaking and in adjudication becomes significant. In adjudication, the staff may
be justified in acting as advocates and in controlling information which it
intends to use. But in rulemaking it is responsible for developing a complete
record, and disclosure of all the information which is needed to enable
participants to question contrary information is essential to that task. 206 The
staff cannot withhold information from the public record merely because it
does not support the rule. In short, its job is not to "prove the rule" but to
insure that the agency makes the right decision, even if that decision is
contrary to the staff's preliminary position.
The Environmental Protection Agency has increased the extent of its
notice in response to judicial pressure. In Portland Cement Association v.
Ruckelshaus,207 the District of Columbia Circuit found that the agency had
failed to disclose in a timely fashion the test methodology and results used in
promulgating a "standard of performance" for Portland cement plants
under the Clean Air Act. 208 As a result, the court ordered that the record be
reopened so that the agency could receive written comments concerning this
information. 209 In reaching the decision, the court expressed the important
proposition that making information publicly available is a necessary element of an efficient and fair rulemaking: ''It is not consonant with the
purpose of. a rulemaking proceeding to promulgate rules on the basis of
inadequate data, or on data that, [to a] critical degree, is known only to the
agency. " 210 The court favored disclosure of information as it was compiled
in the on-going rulemaking process:
In order that rule-making proceedings to determine standards be
conducted in orderly fashion, information should generally be disclosed as to the basis of a proposed rule at the time of issuance. If this
205. See Hamilton, supra note 73, at 63; Reich, The Law of the Planned Society, 75YALE
L.J. 1227, 1244 (1966); Wright, The Courts and the Rulemaking Process: The Limits of Judicial
Review, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 375, 379-81, 395 (1975).
206. See Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, No. 75-1280 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 25, 1977). The
decision is carefully limited to assuring the disclosure of all information used by the agency and
should not be read to impose on inforinal rulemaking the judicial concepts of ex parte communication and separation of function.
207. 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 921 (1974).
208. 486 F.2d at 392.
209. Id. at 393.
210. Id.
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is not feasible, as in case of statutory time constraints, information that
is material to the subject at hand should be disclosed as it becomes
available, and comments received, even though subsequent to issuance
of the rule-with court authorization, where necessary. 211
Largely because of this case, the EPA has established a procedure whereby
the proposed methodology is made public well in advance of a rulemaking
in order to encourage comment. 212
Since the right to participate effectively compels the establishment of a
right of ready access to the information which the agency intends to use in
reaching a regulatory decision, several courts have held that failure to
disclose information important to effective participation will taint the entire
procedure. 213 National Cable Television Association v. FCCZ 14 involved the
production of documents under the FOIA but the case is instructive on the
issue of disclosure in rulemaking. The FCC had promulgated a new licensing fee schedule which would make the agency self-supporting. The key
issue involved the allocation of costs among industries. The court found that
the agency had not made disclosure adequate to enable the interested parties
to contest the rule:
After setting forth this generalized explanation of its approach,
however, the Commission failed to supply specifics, either as to the
facts from which it had reasoned or as to the mechanical steps it had
taken in deriving the final schedule.
Without data concerning the Commission's costs, it is not possible
to determine the basis upon which the Commission allocated its direct
and indirect costs among the regulated industries. Without disclosure
of the final amount the Commission intended to recover from each
industry, it is not possible to determine what, if any, noncost adjustments were made and whether the final schedule had any relation to the
cost allocation. And without a definition and quantification of "value
to the recipient" it is not possible to determine why and how the
Commission might be deviating from a pure system of cost allocation.
Thus, the Commission insulated itself from external criticism of its
211. Id. at 394. See Virgin Islands Hotel Ass'n, Inc. v. Virgin Islands Water and Power
Auth., 465 F.2d 1272, 1276 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1067 (1973) ("Concomitant
with [a meaningful hearing] are the essential requirements of adequate notice, dissemination to
the public of the facts and figures on which the Authority relies, and opportunity afforded to
those attending the hearing to rebut such facts and figures"); Hamilton, supra note 24, at 1333;
Pedersen, supra note 24, at 75.
212. See Williams, supra note 28, at 448-51.
213. See, e.g., Roffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Kliendienst, 478 F.2d I, 19-25 (3d Cir. 1973)
(failure to disclose an advisory committee report was "so egregious as to have tainted the entire
procedure" because the interes.ted party may have made substantial use of the report). But
insignificant nondisclosure, though inexcusable, is not reversible error. Mt. Mansfield Television, Inc. v. FCC, 442 F.2d 470, 489 (2d Cir. 1971).
214. 479 F.2d 183 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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method and rationale, leaving nothing open to challenge except the
legality of its result. 2 ts
This "opaque notice," the court stated, led to the Association's request for
documents under the FOIA. 216 The decision implied that notice, not access
to documents, should have solved the problem of arming participants with
the means for questioning a rule. The term "adequate notice" must be
viewed as commanding the disclosure of all information necessary to permit
effective private participation in the rulemaking. 217
Finally, in Long Island Ry. v. United States 218 the plaintiff railroads
alleged, among other things, that the ICC should have disclosed 32,420 data
sheets. Judge Friendly, writing for a three-judge court, suggested that the
agency might have improved its procedure by serving on the carriers a
detailed summary of the data relied on, but that the failure to do so was not
fatal to the proceeding because the carriers had sufficient notice of the
documents which might have formed the bases of the rule and could have
obtained all the information with little effort on their part. 219 The court was
obviously swayed by the absence of any showing that the lack of disclosure
had hindered the carriers from making an effective argument against the
Commission's proposal. 220 Although this conclusion may reflect proper
judicial restraint in review of harmless procedural defects, a rulemaking
agency should endeavor to disclose everything available to it which may be
used in considering a proposed rule. 221 The primary issue here is not merely
215. Id. at 187.
216. Id. As to the merits of the FOIA request, the court suggested that the scope of the
request "was coextensive with the scope of the Commission's documentary basis for its rules."
Id. at 195. The documents were ones which the agency should have been able to identify, since
it relied on them, and the court therefore ordered disclosure except where one of the exemptions in the FOIA applied. Id. at 194.
217. See Bristol-Myers Co. v. FI'C, 424 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824
(1970) (FI'C was required to disclose the basis for the "reasons to believe" upon which it
determined to issue a proposed rule); South Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646, 659-60 (1st
Cir. 1974) (court denied petitioners' claims that the EPA had given inadequate notice of the
technical documents which would be relied upon, noting with approval that the EPA published
notice that technical support documents were available).
218. 318 F. Supp. 490 (E.D.N.Y. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, United States v. Florida E.
Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224 (1973).
219. Id. at 498-99.
220. Id. at 499. Similarly, in South Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646,660 (1st Cir. 1974),
the First Circuit found that document disclosed after the hearing did not contain any information petitioners needed. See Chrysler Corp. v. Department of Transp., 472 F.2d 659, 681 (6th
Cir. 1972) (failure to disclose certain materials in a more timely fashion was cured by the
opportunity for comment after the materials were made available); accord, District of Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d 971, 997 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
221. One commentator has suggested that an agency should make timely voluntary disclosure of all information to which a person could obtain access under the FOIA. See Pedersen,
supra note 24, at 83. This does not go far enough, however. It is urged that agencies place in a
readily accessible public record (and give notice of how to obtain access) to all information
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the ability of an interested person to dispute the rule, but the extent to which
openness will facilitate and stimulate effective comment. 222 Thus, the notice
of disclosure must also provide sufficient time to permit preparation of
effective comment. 223
CONCLUSION

In rulemaking, as well as formal adjudication, adequate sources of
information are essential to effective participation. Therefore, the development of improved rulemaking procedures should include the incorporation
of the various information gathering mechanisms traditionally available in
adjudication. The investigative nature of rulemaking dictates that any improvement in the information gathering process will enhance the policy
decision expressed in the rule.
The nature of the rulemaking process may affect the application of
traditional discovery devices. Prehearing conferences can solve many of the
problems inherent in the movement to engraft some trial procedures onto the
rulemaking process. Compulsory process may enhance the opportunity to
participate by permitting the accumulation of information favorable to an
interest and by fostering the confrontation of adverse information. But the
broad scope of many rulemaking efforts compels substantial control of
compulsory process with respect to private information. Little control,
however, need be imposed on the opportunity to obtain documentary ~nfor
mation in government files. Here the Freedom of Information Act becomes
an essential tool to anyone participating in an informal agency proceeding.
The traditional discovery device of written interrogatories meshes well with
notice and comment rulemaking because it offers the opportunity for interested persons to rebut or bolster information in written form and ,diminishes the need for the testimonial devices normally used at trial. Other
traditional devices, such as depositions and admissions, do not appear
generally appropriate to rulemaking but in rare situations may also enhance
the information gathering process. And no discovery system is complete
disclosable under the Act as well as other information which they are not required to disclose
but which they may use in the rulemaking. See id. at 78-79. Pedersen's suggestion reflects far
more concern for a useful record in review than for assuring effective participation. See id. at
78-79.
222. See FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279 (1965). "Publicity tends to stimulate the flow of
information and public preferences which may significantly influence administrative and legislative views as to the necessity and character of prospective action." Id at 294. See also S. Doc.
No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 258 (1946).
223. See Fund for Animals v. Frizzell, 530 F.2d 982, 990 (D.C. Cir. 1976). In Frizzell, the
court was skeptical, but upheld the rule despite the very short period between notice and the
end of the comment period. Ordinarily, the court suggested, notice should be given at the time a
decision that a new regulation is being considered becomes concrete. See Pedersen, supra note
24, at 85.
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without some devices in the nature of protective orders for maintaining the
confidentiality of information.
Complementary to a discovery system is a strict requirement of agency
disclosure of the information on which its proposed rule has been based and
which may be used to reach a final regulatory determination. The notion of
adequate notice should be interpreted as requiring the agency to disclose and
make readily accessible all the information it has relative to the rule.
Complementing this full notice could be a requirement that the agency or its
investigative staff publish with the proposed rule a preliminary "statement
of basis and purpose."
Discovery and disclosure thus become not only matters of fairness but
means by which the agency can attract more information and purify that
which it attracts. In sum, adequate access to information is an important
element in fair and efficacious rulemaking.

